McCook Runs Away?

While overall, Peter Cozzens’ This Terrible Sound is an excellent account of Chickamauga, one of tne of the things I don’t like about it is the author’s sometimes facile judgements of some of the participants. A case in point is Alexander McDowell McCook, and his departure from the field.

After the breakthrough at Brotherton Field and the rout of Davis & Sheridan, says Cozzens “the only life General McCook cared about at the moment was his own.” Cozzens quotes William P. Carlin, who in his own memoirs was quite critical of McCook, and Colonel John P. Sanderson, who reported an unidentified general as “running away…like a scared hare.” Sanderson, Cozzens surmises, could only be referring to McCook. Cozzens has McCook drawing his weapon on a civilian guide, threatening to “blow his head off” but fails to note the whole context of that scene. (See This Terrible Sound p. 391.)

McCook was granted a board of inquiry for his actions that day, and was ultimately cleared of any wrongdoing. It is hard to see why, if given only the evidence presented above. Of course, a number of officers testified at that hearing, and it was held in early 1864, only five months after the battle, not based on recollections from years after the fact (as was, for example, Carlin’s account.) Taken in full, a somewhat different picture emerges.

Alexander McCook was not a coward. Colonel Thruston once observed that he “was wholly without fear in battle.” He was not afraid of the front line, as he proved on several fields; He had a horse shot out from under him at Stones River. He lacked, however, that particular quality that Napoleon valued so highly in a solder: Luck. His corps was attacked and all but routed three times during the course of the war. At Perryville he fought alone, unsupported, while the bulk of the Federal army watched – largely because a trick of atmospherics hid the sound of the fight from his army commander. At Stones River, he was struck by the main weight of Braxton Bragg’s assault – exactly as Rosecrans intended to have happen – but the army was again slow to come to his aid. Now, his men were being swept from the field again.

Despite Carlin’s implication, McCook wasn’t fleeing. Instead, he was trying to arrest the panic that seemed to grip his troops. He deployed his cavalry escort as a picket line to stop straggling, and set his aides to trying to restore order. However, the scope of this new disaster mentally flummoxed McCook, a condition that would persist for several hours. A short while after that first meeting with Carlin, McCook returned, staff in tow, to tell Carlin that “we couldn’t do anything with our men.” For his part, Carlin re-iterated his idea of rallying on a distant ridge. Didn’t Carlin see “the rebel cavalry coming?” asked McCook. Carlin saw no Confederates at all. Again McCook rode away, leaving Carlin alone.

McCook was on his way to Chattanooga, though that was not his intended destination.

Unlike both Crittenden and Thomas, McCook was completely unfamiliar with the terrain he was now traversing. Both the XIV and XXI Corps had marched back and forth over the surrounding countryside for the past week; a fortnight in Crittenden’s case. Their maps were updated and their staffs familiar with the road net. McCook’s XX Corps, however, had just arrived on the scene, after their hard marching up from Alpine.

McCook’s first thought, like everyone else, was to join up with Thomas. After leaving Carlin, McCook apparently moved north, towards the Vittitoe House. He first found Jef. Davis, rallying a few stragglers, but with no idea where the rest of his division was to be found. Davis recalled that McCook “expressed fear of the enemy’s cavalry getting around in our rear,” an also noted that it was so far impossible to rally his division, and that he needed to fall back farther. McCook agreed and left Davis to his work. A few yards farther north McCook’s party met Captain Michael Sheridan, the general’s younger brother and aide, who informed him that Sheridan’s division was rallying off to the southwest, perhaps a mile and a half from Crawfish Springs. McCook left the younger Sheridan with orders for his brother to fall back on Rossville if he met up with the division first, and then set out in that direction himself.

Along the way, McCook met a number of staff officers from both Crittenden’s and Rosecrans’s headquarters. Determining the exact sequence of these chance encounters is impossible, but they all happened between 1 and 2:00 p.m., while McCook was seeking a path that would get him to Thomas. Among the first was with Brigadier General James St. Clair Morton. Morton was wounded in the arm, and in some pain, but asked to be placed temporarily in McCook’s service until he could re-connect with Rosecrans. Morton also remembered that McCook seemed “perfectly composed, and…deeply sensible to the reverse the army sustained.”

Colonel John Sanderson was also present when Morton and McCook met, though he did not join McCook’s party. Both groups met near a road jammed with stragglers and transport of all kinds; Sanderson and some other staff officers were engaged in trying to untangle that mess when McCook rode by, and Morton attached himself to the XX Corps’s headquarters group. Shortly thereafter rumor buzzed that Rosecrans was alive and not a prisoner; Sanderson and some others headed towards Rossville in order to find him.

Sanderson also noted one other person with Morton, and subsequently McCook: John McDonald, who had been pressed into Federal service as a guide. McDonald had lived in the area for seventeen years, and his very doorstep and yard were now littered with the casualties of John Beatty’s and John Breckinridge’s fight. McDonald had been with Rosecrans when the line broke, and stuck to Morton. Now his services were needed. McCook explained that they wanted to go to Thomas. Everyone understood that the direct route was impossible, and so McDonald would have to find a safer path.

What followed was a disaster, at least for McCook’s subsequent career and reputation. McDonald set off bearing southwest, and led the group on what ultimately proved to be a ten mile diversion. Captain Alexander McClurg noted that “when we were following the guide, he kept bearing toward the left.” The farther they rode, the more uneasy McCook became. “Several times the general expressed the opinion we were going too far to the left: two or three times he rode to the right himself, stopped, and listened to the artillery fire…” At one point McCook halted. “that was certainly General Thomas’ guns, and…we should keep more to the right, and not in the direction the guide was taking us.” McDonald insisted that his route “was the only feasible one.” By now, many of the group were growing suspicious of McDonald. McClurg quietly asked another officer “whether the guide was reliable…” Was he taking them into Rebel lines?

Once they crossed Missionary Ridge and debauched into Chattanooga Valley, Morton knew they had gone wildly astray. Here the wounded engineer applied himself with map and “prismatic compass,” trying to track the dust and smoke rising from the now distant battlefield. There was bad news, Morton concluded: “the whole army was in retreat for Chattanooga.”

McCook was furious, mostly at McDonald, who by now must have understood his own danger. “With his revolver almost under the man’s nose,” McCook raged, “‘If you guide us into Rebel lines I will blow your head off!’” Trooper Davis of the 15th Pennsylvania, who witnessed this scene, added that “the general [then] used some additional adjectives.” The damage was done, however; the whole group was by now miles away from where they intended to be. Riding north along the Chattanooga Valley Road, when they reached the intersection with the Rossville and Chattanooga road, they met Unionist Tennesseans from Brigadier General James Spears’ brigade. McCook was four miles beyond Rossville, and less than two miles from Chattanooga. Spears also informed McCook of Rosecrans’ presence in Chattanooga. With Chattanooga so close, McCook decided that they had best first ride into town and consult with Rosecrans before riding back to Rossville. It was about 4:00 p.m. when the XX Corps commander and his entourage drew rein in front of Rosecrans’ command post.

It is impossible, from this distance in time, to know whether John McDonald deliberately led McCook astray, or if he was simply overwhelmed and lost himself. If the latter, then once again bad luck plagued Alexander McDowell McCook. His absence during that critical Sunday afternoon was both noted and remarked on. The XX Corps was effectively decapitated at a stroke, and the leadership void would continue to be evident for the rest of the day.

The decision to go to Chattanooga first cost McCook command of the XX Corps, though it remains an open question whether or not he would have been relieved if he had gone to Rossville right away – he had left his command at a moment of crisis. What he should have done, of course, was collect up Davis, both of them find Sheridan, and take charge of what was left of the corps. At the very least, his presence was badly needed later that afternoon, when Sheridan, Davis, and Negley were at Rossville, all debating what they should do next, and all reaching different conclusions.

Lee’s Lie

On September 22nd, 1863, half way between Ringgold and Chattanooga, Braxton Bragg took the time to vent his frustrations in a letter to his wife. He’d just won the battle of Chickamauga, but the victory had been both bloody and precarious. Greater success eluded him, he felt, largely because of incompetent Generals. Chief among those ranked Leonidas Polk, Bishop of Louisiana, Lieutenant General of the Confederacy, and intimate of Jefferson Davis.

Two days before, Bragg had assigned Polk the key role in his intended assault on Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland, to commence at “day-dawn.” Bragg gave Polk his instructions at 9:00 p.m. the evening before, in plenty of time to prepare for the attack. He assigned Polk a powerful force – five divisions of troops, nearly 30,000 men. There was no reason, thought Bragg, that the attack should not go off as planned.
Instead, as he informed Elise, sunrise came and went without the roar of battle. Anxious, he dispatched Major Pollock B. Lee to discover what was happening. An hour or so later, Lee returned, bearing an outrageous – and infuriating – tale. Lee found Polk an hour after sunrise, “two miles from his troops sitting in a rocking chair at a house, waiting his breakfast,” and reading a newspaper. When Lee asked about the attack, Polk replied that “he did not know why the action had not commenced, as ‘he had ordered it.’”

This incident is one of the more famous command miscues of the entire war, (rivaling the loss of Special Orders 191) and there is no doubt that Polk failed to do his full duty that morning. Polk failed to communicate with General Hill, who was to lead the attack, nor tell General Breckinridge, who spent the night at Polk’s fire, that he was part of the effort. It is pretty hard to defend Polk’s laxity.

However, Lee’s fiction was nothing but slander. I won’t attempt to dissect the actual event in any great detail, but suffice to say that Polk was up before dawn, and when he also heard no sounds, dispatched couriers to order Hill into the attack immediately. While that attack did not happen, it was not because Polk was enjoying a delightful Sunday brunch.

Bragg is pretty clear that Lee was the source of the tale. As soon as 8:00 a.m. that same morning, in a meeting with Hill, Bragg relayed the essential details of the fable to his fellow North Carolinian. He also reiterated those same details in letters to his wife and to President Davis, just days after the battle; and, as late as 1873, to a fellow former Confederate.

Luck did not shine on Pollack Lee’s early career as a soldier. He joined the service as a staff officer, commissioned originally as a major in the Tennessee state forces by Governor Isham Harris. That commission transferred to Confederate service when Tennessee embraced the Confederacy. Lee, in the meantime, was serving as a member of Felix K. Zellicoffer’s military family. In November of 1861, he transferred to the staff of George Bibb Crittenden, the Confederate brother of Thomas L. Crittenden. That transfer proved to be a poor career move. Not only did George B. Crittenden lose the battle of Mill Springs Kentucky the following January, but Zellicoffer was killed and Crittenden turned out to be a drunk. With one patron dead and the other in disgrace, Lee spent most of 1862 in rear echelon positions. He missed the battle of Shiloh, the invasion of Kentucky, and other notable events.

Finally, in November 1862, Crittenden’s resignation was accepted and Crittenden then recommended Lee to the Richmond authorities for other service. After serving on various inspection and judicial boards, Lee joined the Army of Tennessee, catching on as a member of Bragg’s Staff.

There is no record of Lee serving with Polk prior to Chickamauga, though of course Lee would have come into contact with Polk while with Bragg, and Lee must have been aware of the controversies embroiling the army in the Spring of 1863. Perhaps his loyalty to Bragg manifested as a dislike of Polk strong enough to fabricate the porch tale. The surviving record is sparse, however, and Lee never explained his version of the story.

In fact, at least once he denied being the source of the tale, in a confrontation a few weeks after the battle. His denial was not credible. After Bragg’s relief, Lee was again transferred to rear area duty. Polk, of course, had been transferred to Mississippi in the interim, and commanded the forces there until he was called back to join the Army of Tennessee in May, 1864. Sometime that spring, in a move that only a military bureaucracy could think made sense, Lee was assigned as an Inspector to Polk’s department in Mississippi. He was not made welcome.

A number of family members served on Polk’s staff, including his son William M Polk, and a cousin, Marshall T. Polk. Marsh Polk commanded an artillery battery at Shiloh, where he was badly wounded and lost a leg, whereupon he transferred to the General’s staff.

When Lee arrived at Polk’s headquarters, Marsh Polk met him with “the most scathing denunciation as a lying poltroon and cowardly cur.” The one-legged Polk then challenged Lee to a duel. Lee declined, refusing to fight a cripple. James H. Polk, who was acting as Marsh’s second in the matter, then offered to take Marsh’s place. Lee refused to fight him as well.

One night subsequent to these events, chance brought Lee and Marsh Polk together in the public room of a hotel, whereupon Marsh lit into Major Lee. “In the presence of a large gathering of officers, Marsh denounced [Lee] as a liar and a coward, shaking his finger at him and telling him that the ball which carried away his leg had spared his right arm and trigger finger. Lee slunk out of the hotel and we saw no more of him.”
Lee continued to serve in staff positions throughout the war, with the Army of Tennessee up through Hood’s disastrous final campaign in Tennessee. His last official appointment before war’s end came on April 20, 1865, when he was named as a staff officer to Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. He was still a major.

Lee was never promoted, never commanded troops in battle, and served in largely anonymous staff positions through the war. He left – as far as I can tell – no personal papers, nor did he contribute anything like reminiscences or to veteran’s activities after the war – again, as far as I know.

Lee apparently died in 1872, but no heirs could be found, or so I surmise from legal notices published in the Memphis Appeal that summer; but even an obituary notice has proved difficult to locate. If anyone has any more knowledge of Lee or his family, I would certainly like to hear from you.

“The Project”

I have wanted to post on Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell and how he came to command the Union Cavalry Corps at Chickamauga for some time now, but frankly, the story seems to grow more complicated each time I examine it. It’s not just that the experience of Mitchell, who missed the first part of the campaign and reached the corps just days before Stanley took ill, is obscure. The larger question is why General Rosecrans, who spent so much effort in the spring of 1863 trying to recruit up his mounted arm and seemed to take such an interest in it at the brigade and regimental level, was not similarly focused on creating an effective divisional and corps structure.
And so what began as a simple post about a relatively unknown political general from Kansas is morphing into a deeper examination of the Army of the Cumberland Cavalry Corps, a far more comprehensive project than is suitable for a blog post. As a result, poor General Mitchell will have to wait…

Instead, I want to announce a project that still seems too good to be true, at least from my perspective.

More than once, I have mentioned – on tours or just doing ACW-ish stuff with friends – that I harbor an ambition to do a multi-volume study of Chickamauga, devoting a volume each to September 19th and 20th, 1863. Both the Maps of Chickamauga and Failure In The Saddle have been satisfying in their own right, but each project is of necessity limited in scope. I’d like to do something more ambitious – or more grandiose, if you will – in covering the whole battle.

So why not two volumes? The first would cover the campaign from the Crossing of the Tennessee at the end of August until nightfall on September 19th; the second to pick up with from there and ending on September 22nd or 23rd, with the Federals ensconced in Chattanooga and Bragg trying to figure out “what next?”

The answer to that question, at least until recently, was “because you’ll never find a publisher, dummy.”:)

A few weeks ago, that answer changed.

My current publisher, Ted Savas, called me and broached the idea. I’m sure I’ve mentioned the concept to Ted casually in the past, but we’d never had any serious discussions about it. So when Ted called, suggesting this very project, I was floored. Yes, my love of the battle of Chickamauga would certainly induce me to write it. But would the book-buying public’s interest in Chickamauga make the project commercially viable? Ted thinks the answer is yes. He’s even suggested that we might include a 3rd volume, an extended set of appendices similar to Dr. Joseph Harsh’s “Sounding the Shallows,” which accompanied his outstanding volumes on Antietam.

My first thought? It’s really gonna suck when I wake up and find that it was all a dream.

My second? How can I refuse?

So I am writing. The best news is that I actually have been writing for a long time, sort of on the side, in hopes that I would eventually find a home for it. I actually have the bulk of this all written, at least in rough draft. I estimate it will require about 50 to 55 chapters, (not including all those appendices) of which I have about 38 finished. (Again, in rough draft. Lots of revising ahead. Oh Joy!) That means that “the project” is not just a distant gleam, but actually within 18 months to a year of completion.

My final thought? Thanks Ted. As long as you’re not really Lucy in disguise, about to yank that football out of the way at the last minute…

You wouldn’t toy with a guy that way, would you?

Change to March Study Group, please note:

Your fearless blog host has had an “oops” moment.

I got the dates wrong for our March tours. the new dates are:

March 9 and 10, 2012

I have changed the previous post and sent out corrected emails. I hope no one is too inconvenienced by this error. My apologies

CCNMP 2012 Study Group

Fall’s been busy, too busy to get much done here it seems.:)

It is now time, however, to announce our schedule for the March 2012 tours, our annual two day trip to the battlefield. The schedule is as follows. Pleasee feel free to re-post or pass this along…

CCNMP Study Group 2012 Seminar in the Woods.
March 9-10, 2012
Friday: All Day, on bus:

Meet at 8:00 am at the CCNMP visitor’s center

Friday Morning – 21st Corps in the Chickamauga campaign.
By bus, we will explore the movements of the Union 21st Corps as it occupies Chattanooga and then advances on Ringgold between September 9th and 11th, 1863. Less studied than the more famous action in McLemore’s Cove, Major General Thomas L. Crittenden’s advance on Ringgold still posed a threat to Bragg’s rail connection, moving south along the Western and Atlantic while the main Rebel army was falling back to LaFayette. Actions at Graysville and Ringgold highlight this phase of the campaign.

Lunch: Since we will be close to the park for most of the day, we will arrange for lunch at a local restaurant, probably the Park Place, between Noon and 1 PM. More to follow on that.

Friday Afternoon – Retreating as fast as they can go? Thomas at Rossville, September 21, 1863.
By bus, we will explore the Union retreat from the battlefield on the night of September 20th, and examine the position Major General George Thomas adopted by dawn on September 21st. Far from fleeing in disorder, the Army of the Cumberland had largely re-organized and was ready for a fight on Monday morning. We will also discuss the various Confederate efforts at reconnaissance of this new Union position, and how successful those efforts were.

Saturday Morning, 8:30 a.m.: Horatio Van Cleve’s Division on September 19th, on foot.
Between about 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on September 19th, two brigades of Van Cleve’s 3rd Division, 21st Corps, attempted to turn the Confederate flank in Brock field. After some initial success against Marcus Wright’s Tennessee Brigade (including Carnes’ Battery) however, Van Cleve’s men met with more Confederates under A.P. Stewart, producing a bloody slugfest in the woods. Eventually, the Federals themselves were outflanked by elements of Bushrod Johnson’s Rebels, resulting in a collapse of the Union line.
Car Caravan from the visitor’s Center.

Saturday Afternoon, 1:30 p.m. Thomas J. Wood and the Battle of Chickamauga. on foot.
No general is more controversial than Tom Wood. His actions on September 20th will be examined in detail, from his infamous movement out of Brotherton Field to his final position on Snodgrass Hill. Along the way we will discuss his culpability in creating the crisis of “the gap,” his relations with other officers in the army, and his contributions to the defense of Horseshoe Ridge.
Car Caravan from the visitor’s Center.

Optional: Sunday, March 18th – Andersonville, with Frank Crawford – car caravan.
Frank has offered to take us down to the National Prisoner of War Museum and historic site at Andersonville. Andersonville lies about 2 hours drive southwest of Atlanta, or roughly four hours south of Chattanooga. While it is remote, that very isolation only adds to the impact of the park and cemetery. Those who wish to attend would drive down on Sunday morning, and spend midday at the park (plan on a couple of hours.) For the return, for those flying it would be best to fly into and out of Hartsfield, in Atlanta.

Cost: Beyond the fee for Friday’s Bus, there is no cost for tour participation. Meals lodging, transportation, and incidentals, however, are the individual’s responsibility.

Tour Departures: All tours will meet at the Chickamauga Visitor’s Center at the designated start time, and will depart from there after some brief overview discussion. We will board the bus or car caravan to the designated parking area, and from there, we will be on foot. We will be on foot for up to three hours, so dress and prepare accordingly. Tours will depart rain or shine. Participants are responsible for their own transportation, and should plan accordingly. All tours are designed to be self-contained, so participants who cannot attend the full schedule are still welcome to join us for any portion of the weekend.

Lodging and Meals: Everyone is responsible for their own lodging and meals. There are many hotels in the greater Chattanooga area, for any price range. The closest are in Fort Olgethorpe, Georgia, with the least expensive in Ringgold. Each tour is designed to leave at least 90 minutes for lunch, and there are several family and fast food restaurants within minutes of the battlefield. There are designated picnic areas near the Visitor’s Center, for those who wish to bring a lunch and eat on the field.

What to bring: Each tour will involve extensive walking. Proper clothing and especially footgear is essential. Dress in layers, wear sturdy, broken-in walking shoes or boots, and be prepared for some rain, as spring can be quite wet in North Georgia. We will be walking on dirt and gravel trails, uncut fields, and through stretches of woods. The ground will be wet and muddy in places. Bring your own water and snacks.

Reading up on the subject: Many people like to prepare in advance for these kinds of events. I suggest the following works might be of help.

Cozzens, Peter. This Terrible Sound. University of Illinois, 1992. The best modern study of the battle.

Powell, David with Cartography by Dave Friedrichs, The Maps Of Chickamauga. Savas-Beatie, 2009.

Powell, David. Failure In The Saddle: Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in the Chickamauga Campaign. Savas-Beatie, 2010.

Woodworth, Stephen E. Six Armies In Tennessee: The Chickamauga And Chattanooga Campaigns. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1998. An excellent overview campaign study.

——————-, A Deep Steady Thunder: The Battle Of Chickamauga. Abilene, Texas. McWhiney Foundation Press, 1998. Concise but very useful account of the battle, designed as an introduction to the action. 100 pages, very readable.

Note: Friday’s Tours will be by Bus, as we move from site to site. While the tour itself is free, we do have to pay for the bus.

Pre-registration Fee: $35 Due by February 1st, 2011

Send to:
FRANK CRAWFORD
34664 ORANGE DRIVE
PINELLAS PARK, FLORIDA 33781
Frank will hold your payments. If you pay by check, note that Frank will not cash those checks until we have sufficient entries, so that if we have to refund, Frank will simply send your checks back to you.
Please also note that this fee is NON-REFUNDABLE after February 1st, 2011. Once we are committed to the bus, we will be charged the booking fee.

If you wish to attend the Sunday trip to Andersonville, please inform Frank at this time.

On-site Sign up Fee: $40
We MUST have 20 attendees registered and Paid by Feb 1st, or we cannot reserve the bus. Once we confirm the minimum, you will be able to join the tour the day we depart, for late add-ons. If we do not meet the minimum, we will car-caravan for Friday’s tours.

Final note: Last year we raised a sizable amount of money over and above the cost of the bus, and were able to contribute a number of new titles to the CCNMP research library, mostly regimental histories of recent vintage. The park currently does not have operating funds allocated for these kinds of acquisitions, and depends entirely on donations to fund library additions. I feel that this is an ideal use for any excess funds we raise, in keeping with the “study group” mission.

September again…

Today I am at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park, and will be here for the next week. I will have the chance to roam the field on my own for a couple of days, and then at the end of the week I am thrilled to be a part of the Civil War Trust’s fall gathering, held this year in Chattanooga. I will be taking some preliminary groups around on thursday or Friday, and leading one of the bus tours on Saturday. Nothing would please me more than to be able to help turn the focus of CWT and of land preservation to these battles. There are opportunities to preserve core battlefield lands on both fields. I hope that we can encourage some preservation around the Reed’s Bridge area, an area of much crucial action on September 18th, 1863.

Jim Ogden and Glenn Robertson will be the lead guides over the weekend, and both will doubtless be busy arguing for that increased focus as well.

In addition to all that, of course, the park begins it’s annual commemoration in the coming week, extending up through next Monday and Tuesday. If you can spare the time, come see the CCNMP this weekend, and experience the programs and educational efforts the staff take the time to organize. The weather should be great (barring any new tropical storms!) and the field is in first-rate condition. Summer thinning efforts have left the woods in better condition than ever, and even the casual tromper can gain a much better understanding of the lines of sight, nature of the ground, and appreciation for the troop positions now visible.

Dave Powell

Who Where Those Guys? (Part One)

The Engineer

Among the commanders in the Army of the Cumberland, two men are notable for not being much noted. In fact, there is a certain amount of mystery wrapped around each of them. They are Brigadier Generals James St. Clair Morton, Rosecrans’ chief engineer, and Robert Mitchell, acting Cavalry Corps commander. They both have interesting roles to play at Chickamauga, but their stories tend to be obscured by the larger more famous dramas surrounding the battle.

James St. Clair Morton was much like a younger version of Rosecrans himself: Brilliant and meticulous, brash and opinionated. Originally from Philadelphia, he graduated from West Point in 1851, 2nd in his class, and spent the next decade on engineering projects, much as Rosey did. Morton challenged conventional wisdom on fortifications, authoring a paper on the flaws in New York’s existing harbor defenses. He was for a time chief engineer for the Washington Monument, taught at the Academy, surveyed the possibility of an isthmus canal, and built forts around the country. He saw no combat in those ante-bellum years.

He became Don Carlos Buell’s chief engineer in May, 1862, and continued on in that post under Rosecrans. As such, most of the fortifications the Army of the Ohio/Cumberland came to rely on to secure its supply lines and rear areas were conceived and built by Morton: the defenses of Nashville, the fortifications at Gallatin, Fortress Rosecrans, and numerous smaller blockhouses and RR defenses.

One of the Army of the Cumberland’s most important assets was the Pioneer corps, a hand-picked force of 20 men from each regiment – machinists, engineers, carpenters and artificers of all kinds – that provided the army with several thousand skilled laborers. Trained and administered by Morton, the Pioneers proved themselves both on and off the battlefield. They performed both bridging and combat duties at Stones River, for example. After Chickamauga, they ran the sawmills and built the pontoons that made the ‘Cracker Line’ possible. They, along with the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics (who did most of the railroad work) amounted to one of the Army of the Cumberland’s ‘secret weapons’ in tackling the huge engineering challenges attendant with the difficult campaign for Chattanooga.

Morton served as Rosecrans’ Chief Engineer through the fall of 1863, and then resigned his volunteer commission to revert to the rank of regular army major. Why he did so is somewhat of a mystery. William B. Hazen, in his memoir, says it was because General Rosecrans verbally upbraided him in a most humiliating manner during the Tullahoma campaign, when, as commander of the Pioneers, he proved lax in enforcing discipline and allowed his men to slow up McCook’s XX Corps.

This story may well be true. Certainly McCook was unhappy with the Pioneers that June, and complained about it to headquarters, evidence of which can be found in the Official Records. Morton apparently tendered his resignation at the end of August. Rosecrans wired Henry Halleck on August 27th to ask who might be available to take Morton’s place. Halleck replied that Generals William F. Smith and Henry W. Benham were available. Smith got the nod, with orders cut sending him to replace Morton on September 5th, 1863. He would be a while in arriving, and miss the battle of Chickamauga. In the meantime, Morton continued to serve.

However, if McCook’s complaints and the chewing out by Rosecrans were the cause, why would Morton wait until the end of August to resign? Resigning in July, after Tullahoma, when the army paused for nearly two months and things were quiet, makes much more sense.

At the end of August the Army of the Cumberland embarked on their most ambitious campaign to date, one in which the engineering challenges posed by river and mountain would be huge.

In fact, Morton was present through the campaign, served valiantly at Chickamauga, and played an important role in organizing the defenses of Chattanooga after the disaster on September 20th. Rosecrans praised Morton in his report, suggesting that there was no lasting enmity, at least. Still, when Smith finally arrived on October 12th, Morton handed over his command and went north.

Morton was killed in June, 1864, outside Petersburg, serving as chief engineer to Ambrose Burnside, commanding the Union IX Corps. By all accounts, his was a valiant sacrifice, as he was personally guiding an assault column in order to make sure it did not go off course. He died a major of the regular army, the only Union General to resign his volunteer commission and revert to regular rank, at least according to Ezra Warner. He died young, and apparently left no papers, so the reasons for his resignation remain murky, despite Hazen’s account.

James St. Clair Morton had a profound impact on the Army of the Cumberland, for he both constructed much of the defensive and support infrastructure the army came to rely on, as well as trained and organized the men who built it. His work continued to prove it’s worth long after he left. Sherman’s advance on Atlanta rested on the bedrock of support he built, and might not have been possible without it.

Next time, a little about Robert Mitchell…

A Council of War

It’s one of the most famous scenes of the battle.

Night on September 19th. The fighting has ended for the day, and William S. Rosecrans summons his commanders for a conference to assess the day’s performance. What follows has been described many times: a dozen generals gathered in close quarters at the Widow Glenn’s, each corps commander summarizing their command’s action and losses, discussion of the next day’s fight, and then orders are issued.

George H. Thomas dozes in a chair, periodically awaking only to repeatedly state: “I would strengthen the left” whereupon, each time, Rosecrans says, “yes, but where will we take them from?” The meeting closes with coffee, bacon, hardtack and a mournful dirge sung by McCook – “The Hebrew Maiden’s Lament.” Was Thomas really that passive? Rosecrans that plaintively passive? Did McCook really sing? These actions seem odd from senior commanders in an army fighting for its very survival.

Anyone who reads more than a single book on the Army of the Cumberland and the battle of Chickamauga will soon be struck by how similar the various descriptions scan. Over the 4th of July weekend, I have been re-reading all the accounts of that meeting I can find, and that similarity struck home with more than usual force.

The reason is obvious, with a little cross-referencing. There is really only one published account that offers any detail – that from the “pen” of Charles Dana, in his “Personal Recollections of the Civil War.” For example, the details on Thomas and McCook’s entertainment come solely from him. Or, more accurately, they stem from the able pen of Miss Ida M. Tarbell, who in fact wrote the memoirs from a series of interviews she conducted with Dana in the 1890s. This is not to say that Dana’s memoir is not generally reliable – it is, according to Historian Paul M. Angle, who wrote a preface explaining the origin of the memoir for a 1963 edition of the work – but that according to Angle, but not every detail should be considered irrefutable.

Dana was not a military man. Instead, he was a newspaper editor, working with Horace Greeley on the staff of the New York Tribune. Upon leaving that paper in 1862, Edwin M. Stanton offered him a job as an Assistant Secretary of War, to be the roving eyes-and-ears of the Secretary in the headquarters of distant commanders. After a stint with Grant at Vicksburg, September 1863 found him joining Rosecrans at Chattanooga.

Dana’s relationship with the generals he observed was complicated. He was, in effect, a spy, and all knew it. Grant’s staff, understanding the potential harm he could wreak, befriended Dana and won him over. Rosecrans and his people, however, proved less perceptive, and allowed their disdain for him to show. Dana reciprocated that chilly reception, and his dispatches ultimately went a long way towards derailing Rosecrans’ career.

Dana was in all likelihood present for that evening conference. He was an assistant Secretary of War with a direct line to Stanton and Lincoln and he was sent to the Army for the express purpose of observing Rosecrans. Dana sent eleven detailed reports of the unfolding battle from the field telegraph at Rosey’s headquarters direct to Washington on September 19th alone, offering us almost hourly updates revealing the extent of the Army high command’s perceptions of the day’s events.
Unfortunately, he did not offer up a similar cable describing the evening conference, so that we might have something to compare to his recollections 30 years later. Nor did any of the generals who participated leave us with an eyewitness account, either. There is one other partial record of the meeting, however, that compares to Dana’s in detail. Colonel Horace N. Fisher, serving on McCook’s staff, accompanied his chief to the meeting, to report on the readiness and strength of the Corps. In 1890, Fisher penned a memorandum describing that meeting. Fisher’s evidence isn’t any fresher than Dana’s, being written 27 years later, but at least he was an insider, not a resented outsider.

Both accounts (as well as the various summaries presented by others) agree on the basic outlines. First came reports on the status of the various commands, then a discussion on the situation and what they should do, and finally, Rosecrans’ orders, written out and then read aloud before all present, to make sure everyone understood the next day’s plan.

But Fisher has Thomas standing before a fire, not dozing in a chair, and offering up a cogent summary at the end of the discussion, not simply muttering repeatedly about ‘strengthening the left.’ Thomas urged a retreat to Rossville, where the army could make a stand against what where clearly heavy odds (all present understood that Bragg had been heavily reinforced by now.) Rosecrans queried Granger about the defensibility of Rossville Gap that night, which lends a great deal of credence to the idea, and Thomas did in fact fall back to Rossville on the night of the 20th, almost as if he planned to all along. This all suggests that Fisher’s account is the more accurate when it comes to George Thomas’ participation.

Moreover, while Dana has both the corps and divisional commanders being called to the conference, Fisher says that only the corps commanders were called. This makes more sense, given that Dana remembered only 10-12 people in the room. Had the divisional commanders attended, that would mean at least 19 generals present, plus some staff officers, far too many to be contained in the Widow Glenn Cabin. Rosecrans, Garfield, three corps commanders, and a few staff officers, however, gets us to Dana’s number fairly quickly.

Only two divisional commanders tried to visit HQ that night, according to their own accounts: Palmer and Sheridan. Palmer was turned away, more in keeping with Fisher’s version than Dana’s. Sheridan claims he attended, but the timeline he presents in his memoirs is not workable. Sheridan says that after he got his new orders and moved his division into place, he then visited the Departmental HQ, where he found “most of the superior officers of the army” gathered. He claims he listened to the ensuing discussion (and reported that the mood was one of ‘general depression’) and then returned to his command, uneasy about the next day.

How can this be? The discussion he claimed to witness happened before the new orders were issued, not after. If he waited until his division completed its movement back to the foothills of missionary Ridge, as he said, it would be nearly dawn by the time he could report to HQ and by then, all the officers he claimed to have met were gone – carrying out their own orders. They did not return to the army HQ afterwards. In short, Sheridan’s much quoted Memoir is not accurate. Crittenden and McCook did visit Sheridan’s HQ later that night, which might explain the Irishman’s ‘confusion’ but no matter what, Sheridan’s account does not square with the known facts. It cannot be regarded as trustworthy.

To a lesser extent, neither can Dana’s. Was Thomas really sleeping through the whole thing? That makes little sense, given how much Rosecrans was relying on Thomas’ judgment and decision-making by now. Yes, Thomas was tired, having gotten no sleep the night before. That condition, however, applied to everyone in the room, not just the burly Virginian.
And yet, Dana’s account drives every modern historical description of the moment, with the notable exception of Glenn Robertson’s work. Unfortunately, Fisher’s account was never published, though it can be found in the files of the National Military Park. It deserves wider attention, since it makes much more sense than Dana’s odd version of the night’s events.

What other widely accepted scenes of the battle might be worth a closer look? I suspect a great many…

The Wrong Place at the Wrong Time

Dr. Keith Bohannon of the University of West Georgia is a fellow student of the battle of Chickamauga, and seems to love delving into archives as much as I do. Recently he transcribed an account of Captain Henry Smith’s experiences at Chickamauga, and shared that account with several of us who care about such things. I found several things in it that got me thinking…

At about 8:00 p.m. on September 19, 1863, Confederate Brigadier General Preston Smith and several of his aides encountered what they thought was a regiment of fellow Confederates, but in fact turned out to be the 77th Pennsylvania of Joseph Dodge’s Brigade, 2nd Division, the XX Corps. Smith expected to find Texans from Brigadier General James C. Deshler’s brigade, Cleburne’s Division. Smith was supposed to be supporting Deshler’s Brigade in a night attack.

Night attacks are tricky things. Deshler went astray, opening up a gap through which Smith’s line advanced, unwittingly, straight into the Union line. Smith was being cautious that night and did not just go charging off into the gloom, however. Instead he halted his line after moving several hundred yards and rode ahead, his aides in tow, to reconnoiter.

Years later, Captain Henry H. Smith, former member of the 1st Tennessee Infantry and nephew to the general, recalled the moment. Stumbling into this unknown body of men, Smith – thinking they might belong to Deshler or even be part of his own brigade that had moved too far forward – called out to them. “Who’s there?” came the reply. “your commander, General Preston Smith” snapped the general. “We do not know you” retorted the men. Then someone thought to ask, ‘which command?’ “The 69th Indiana.”

Captain Smith’s memoir was written in 1899, “dictated entirely from memory and without the aid of any notes, memoranda or books of any description,” and so we can forgive his memory for failing to remember the correct number of the Federal regiment in question. This quibble and a couple of other minor discrepancies in his account of the affair, however, don’t detract from the overall authenticity of the recollection of that night.

General Smith, thinking perhaps to bluff his way past the danger, immediately demanded that the Yankees surrender. In reply, about thirty Pennsylvanians fired their rifles. General and Captain Smith were both hit. Preston Smith was mortally wounded, dying within the hour, while Henry had his leg broken, and nearly amputated. Captain Smith survived, of course, but was months recovering. They were not the only two men shot. Captain Thomas E. King was also fatally wounded, also dying within a few minutes of the encounter. Captain John Donelson was killed outright, at the side of Colonel A. J. Vaughn of the 13th Tennessee, as they came forward.

Preston Smith’s death is a famous incident of the battle, marked by a shell pyramid and tablet. There are a number of interesting side-stories connected with the occurrence, as well. For instance, Union Colonel Thomas E. Rose commanded the 77th Pennsylvania that night, and was taken prisoner here. Rose later organized and led the famous tunnel escape from Libby Prison the next February, where 109 Federal officers got away, 59 of them eventually returning to Union lines. Smith’s encounter is also the perfect illustration of the dangers of night operations in the Civil War, and helps illustrate why such events were rare.

While the fate of the Confederate captains garner only passing attention in coverage of the affair, they, too, have their own stories to tell. Henry Smith’s memoir set me to wondering what those stories might be.
Thomas King’s is most intriguing. King was the son and grandson of prominent Georgians. His Grandfather was Roswell King, who founded both the town and the mills that have since borne his name. The town of Roswell thrives to this day, but the mills are gone. In 1864, Sherman shipped the workers (almost all women) north and burned the buildings, and even though they were rebuilt after the war, the mills shut for good in 1971.

The King family was large and warlike in 1861. John’s two older brothers, Charles and William, served the Confederacy as a chaplain and doctor, respectively. Another brother, James, operated the family business through most of the war, but after its destruction, fought against Sherman at the head of a local cavalry company. Thomas raised and commanded Company G of the 7th Georgia; his younger brother Joseph joined the same unit as a private. Brother Barrington joined and eventually commanded the cavalry of Cobb’s Legion; Ralph joined the Chatham Artillery, and Clifford served on William J. Hardee’s staff, even marrying that General’s daughter.

Thomas’ only taste of soldiering came in 1861. His ankle was shattered by a musket ball on July 21st of that year, at First Manassas; his brother Joseph was also struck, injured in the hip, leg, and hand. Both men were crippled and returned home. Thomas spent a year on crutches, and then transitioned to a cane. Joseph never fully recovered. For both of them, the war seemed over.

But when the Army of the Cumberland crossed the Tennessee River and entered Georgia, however, Thomas felt he had to do something. On September 14th, as the armies sparred for advantage around Lafayette, Thomas boarded the train north, hoping to volunteer his services – limited as they were- on the staff of either Longstreet or Leonidas Polk. Reaching the battlefield on the morning of the 19th, he found General Smith, who granted him a spot as an aide-de-camp.

That same morning found Captain Henry Smith riding by in the entourage of Nathan Bedford Forrest. Henry joined his uncle’s staff in 1863, but that March had been loaned out to Forrest while the army was stationed in Middle Tennessee. For the past six months, Henry remained with the hard-bitten raider. When Forrest’s column bumped into Smith’s Brigade, however, General Smith reminded Forrest that the loan had been temporary, that Henry had never been formally transferred, and Smith now needed him back. Dutifully, Captain Smith watched Forrest ride off without him.

Here Henry Smith and King became comrades in arms for what proved to be a very short time. Upon meeting King that morning, Smith essayed a rough joke, telling the other that “”if he wanted to keep himself whole, he had made a mistake joining General Smith for, if he followed him, he would surely get a bullet buried in him.” King’s own diary did not record his impressions of Henry’s humor, but did note that by 5:00 p.m. the fight seemed to have quieted down. The battle seemed over for the day.

Of course, then up came Cleburne, and the fateful meeting in the gloom.
Both King and Smith stumbled into the wrong place at the wrong time. If circumstances had been only slightly different, neither man might have been shot that night. Had King found Polk first, or even a different brigade in Cheatham’s Division, he might easily have avoided that night encounter. As it was King was exposed to fire two days in the whole war – and both proved disastrous for him.

As for Smith, while riding with Forrest was no rear-area sinecure, the chance meeting with his old command and his Uncle’s asking for him back is also quite the coincidence.

One final note: The third captain killed that night, John Donelson, was a member of another famous family – the Donelson’s of Tennessee – and had been born in the White House, during Andrew Jackson’s presidency. It seems his mother was serving as a hostess for Jackson, and living in the mansion while pregnant with John. Personally, this piece of trivia strikes me as ironic.

Western Theater Historians Association

Last weekend I was away at the annual meeting of this esteemed group. I’ve been to several of these conferences now, and I’ve found them both enlightening and very good fun. Among the members are many well-respected authors and historians; a mix of both academic and non-academic students of the war. Organized by Mike Ballard and John Marzelak, this group has been meeting for about ten years now, in various locations.

This year we went to Corinth, Mississippi, a reprise of an earlier trip (which happened before I joined.) As you may know, Corinth has a new interpretive center, which has helped to organize and interpret the many scattered sites relating to both the battle and occupation of Corinth during the war. I’ve been to Corinth before, usually in conjuction with a Shiloh trip, but this was the first time where Corinth was the principle focus of my touring.

The Conference opened on Thursday evening with a reception at the Interpretive center and group dinner at a local restaurant. Friday is the centerpiece, with a daylong discussion of various topics relating to the war, with a focus, obviously, on the Western Theater. The discussions are informal, with no presenting of papers or the like. There are a lot of heavy hitters in the room, however, so I find the talks fascinating.

Saturday is usually reserved for touring. We took a look at the battle of Corinth in the morning, and after lunch we did go to Shiloh for a couple of hours. It was on the way home for me, how could I not?

Corinth is important to Chickamauga, I think, mainly for its effect on the career of William Starke Rosecrans. Success at Corinth propelled Rosecrans into command of the Army of the Ohio (soon to be the Army of the Cumberland) less than a month later. The battle of Corinth was fought on October 3rd and 4th; Rosecrans replaced Don Carlos Buell on October 27th. I suspect that without the signal success of Corinth, Rosecrans might not have been tapped for the new job.

Corinth (along with the related action at Iuka in September) also soured relations between Rosecrans and Ulysses S. Grant. So while it set the stage for Rosecrans’ rapid rise, it also laid the groundwork for an equally rapid fall. It would be Grant’s decision that Rosecrans should go in the wake of the defeat at Chickamauga. While I believe that Grant’s decision was in part fueled by personal reasons, it did elevate George Thomas to army command as well.

The Grant-Rosecrarns-Thomas triangle has been studied often by historians, with varying conclusions. Each man has their cheering section. Rosecrans and Thomas fans tend to assail Grant unmercifully, characterizing him as a malicious schemer eaten up by jealousy. I don’t go that far. I think Grant had tough choices to make and not everyone was going to be happy with all of those choices. I do think that Grant was mistaken in some of his character judgements. On the question of who ultimately should have had command of the Army of the Cumberland, and did a better job, I am also not completely certain: I think both Rosecrans and Thomas have pros and cons to consider.

It is clear, however, that before Iuka, Rosecrans and Grant had a much more positive working relationship; had that lasted, Rosecrans might not have been relieved.

http://westerntheaterhistorians.org/sections/Corinth2011/CorinthPix/index.html