Braxton Bragg

As of February 1st, we have 21 paid attendees for the Friday portion of the March tour, and I expect several more will sign up. It’s always good to be able to reserve the bus and not worry that we will be a few dollars short. There are still plenty of seats left, so if you want to sign up, please do.

http://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/2009/11/14/time-for-the-study-group-details/

My goal, as ever, is to focus on a detailed aspect of the battle of Chickamauga and examine it from the ground up, as it were. In the past we have focused on specific actions, units, or leaders. This year we have a mix.

For our Friday tours this year, we are going to spend time with everyone’s favorite General, Braxton Bragg.

What? Bragg’s not your favorite? How about favorite whipping boy, then?

I will be the first to admit that General Bragg is not a Great Captain. In fact, I don’t think he’s much of a commander at all – mainly because he seemed to lack all ability to inspire either troops or subordinate commanders. A beloved general can be forgiven mistakes. A hated general will rarely get credited even for his successes.

But we also need to understand that “It’s not all Bragg’s fault.” Too often that is the standard conclusion of off-the-cuff history. In fact, Bragg faced some very difficult challenges during the campaign, including outright insubordination from some of his generals. Moreover, the Army of Tennessee still lacked professionalism – incompetence could flare up at any time. Nor, even if Davis would let him, could Bragg just relieve officers indiscriminately. The men who would replace them would likely be even more unready for command. It takes time and experience to develop good officer and instill professionalism. During the war, both armies – in both theaters – suffered from these problems, but the Army of Tennessee seemed to manage to distill incompetence to a fine art.

The portrait we have of Bragg at Chickamauga is usually that painted by D. H. Hill, or James Longstreet. When Hill reported to Bragg at the end of July, he found a gaunt, haggard, care-worn figure ground down by defeat and ill health. Hill was shocked; Bragg hardly looked like the man he knew in the old army. Longstreet, for his part, leaves us with an image of Bragg from the afternoon of the 20th – a man out of touch, angry beyond reason that his plans had again gone awry, and dismissive of his own troops. “there is not a man in the right wing that has any fight left in him,” Longstreet has Bragg snapping when asked for support from Polk’s Wing.

Bragg was sick, there is no doubt of that. He was also often enraged, as well. But I am struck by the fact that despite being driven out of Chattanooga, he never stopped thinking of striking back. He did not despair when several of his initial counter-attack schemes (McLemore’s Cove, most famously) derailed. He was dogged, determined, and unwilling to just give up. He hit hard, and in the end, won the day. Heck, this sounds like Grant, not Bragg…

I am also intrigued by a description of Bragg’s headquarters on the morning of September 19th, just after Bragg arrived on the field near Thedford’s Ford. it was not an ideal spot for a commander; being too remote from the action, especially on the second day, but at least initially it was central to most of his army. Colonel Thomas Claiborne of Buckner’s staff recalled that the officers gathered on a hill near the ford, from which they could see the Union positions around Lee and Gordon’s Mills and also the comings and goings of Federals along the Lafayette Road. “Bragg came there…”recalled Claiborne, “and assembled nearly all his commanders in reach for consultation. There was a big crowd of staff.” To me, this hardly smacks of a man sulking in his tent. This is a man who has not given up, despite repeated miscues.

For those of you who attend the tours this coming March, hopefully we can offer up an alternative to the cartoon Bragg so often featured in popular history. We will also be looking at Cleburne’s attack on September 20th and in closing, another aspect of the final Federal retreat from Kelly Field.

For an aspect of Cleburne’s assault:

http://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/2009/09/19/the-condundrum-of-the-rifle-part-iii/

Those Colt Rifles

I got a chance to examine the Quarterly ordnance Returns for the
Federal army this morning, looking to see what the 21st Ohio reported after the battle of Chickamauga.

For the 4th Quarter of 1863, the 21st reported 167 Colts, 82 Enfields, and 15 Springfields on hand – a total of 264 arms. The effects of the Chickamauga losses are still clearly evident, with the 21st still showing half the strength it carried into action on September 20th.

By the 1st Quarter of 1864, with a return dated in March of that year, they do show significant recruitment. More than 500 weapons are on hand, and presumably, the soldiers to use them. However, those weapons are now Enfields. No Colts are reported at all. Easier on the quartermaster, certainly, but I have to wonder how the old hands in the 21st felt about it. If I come across anything that might tell us, I will be sure to let you know.

The 21st Ohio and the Colt Rifle

Marc Grad’s question about the 21st Ohio seems worthy of a blog entry in its own right…

Not all of Rosecrans’ new tactical schemes came to complete fruition. Wilder’s brigade was not the only force intended to be converted to mounted infantry – the previously mentioned 39th Indiana got the nod, as well. However, other units were also intended for this honor.

Anyone who follows Chickamauga comes inevitably to the tale of the 21st Ohio. Now, it seems every regiment in the war has their own uniquely flavored story to tell, full of drama large and small, personalities that are remembered long after they are gone, or anecdotes of either pathos or humor that get told at every reunion. These men do not become faceless hordes, but real people, and I think this aspect is a major reason why the war is so often studied today. We are drawn to their stories, the more vivid the better.

The 21st is no different. I find them a fascinating unit for a variety of reasons. For example, they are the first regiment Tom Custer – George’s brother and ultimately a two-time winner of the Medal Of Honor – served in. Nine members of the 21st volunteered to join the Andrews’ Raiders and helped steal the locomotive “The General” in the spring of 1862, in an effort to destroy the Rail line between Atlanta and Chattanooga. They were captured, and at least one 21ster was hung, but a number made their escape and rejoined the regiment.

But the regiment also suffered command problems, and was cited repeatedly for lax discipline. The first two colonels proved less than satisfactory for a variety of reasons, and at first blush, it might be hard to find a reason why the 21st Ohio would be selected in May, 1863, to receive Colt Revolving Rifles and be mounted, to serve as “cavalry, sharpshooters, or infantry, as occasion might require.” One reason might be a solid combat performance at Stone’s River, where they suffered 159 casualties and, on January 2nd, charged across the frigid river in a counterstroke that helped repulse Breckinridge’s last attack.

The Army of the Cumberland received an alotment of Colt Rifles at this time. The Army of the Potomac was getting rid of the weapon – carried by some eastern cavalry units – in favor of newly produced Sharps, Burnsides, and Maynard Carbines. Rosecrans, who had been begging for suitable weapons for his mounted force, took the cast-offs eagerly. As a result, eight of the 21st’s ten companies were armed with approximately 400 of the rifles.

Tactically, there appears to have been no new training to go along with the rifles. the 21st had been well drilled in Hardee’s during their first two years in service, and carried on with that manual. As skirmishers, they would be called upon to fight more often in open order, but that also did not apparently trigger a new drill method.

However, they did use their newly increased firepower to good effect. I have touched on their final stand in a previous post, and will try to avoid repetition, but I do note that in their only major engagement at Chickamauga, from 1-7 PM on September 20th, they fought mostly in a single line, almost shoulder to shoulder, and often prone. They were forced to do so in order to cover the ground they were assigned. Their line had to be denser than Wilder’s typical formation, as they took heavier losses. the Rebels assaulting them, however, found their firepower to be stunning, even demoralizing.

Ohio Lieutenant William Vance described Kershaw’s first attack in these terms: “at first the charging Johnnies, reaching the proper distance and receiving a volley from the regiment, returned the same and then started on the keen jump, expecting to reach us before we could reload. Before they had advanced ten paces….they would get another volley, and while they were pondering upon this circumstance, still a third; then they would scarcely get their backs turned…[to retreat]…before the fourth would catch them, and [then] on a dead run, the fifth came singing about their ears.”

At the end of the day, when the Ohioans were forced to surrender, Confederates from Preston’s Divisions were so impressed with the colts that at least one Rebel regiment re-equipped their color guard with them.

The 21st Ohio ultimately lost 243 of the 561 officers and men engaged on Horseshoe ridge, including 131 missing, presumed captured. Nor do these losses tell the whole story; due to the confused nature of the final retreat, a great many of the wounded were also captured, and stragglers were a problem. The next morning only 60 men were present; even three days later the regiment numbered no more than 100. A great many Colt Rifles were lost, as well, and so while some Colts lingered in the regiment through the war, most of the regiment reverted to rifled muskets.

A good cause…

Recently, I heard from Evan Jones, one of the organizers of the 25th annual West Coast Civil War Conference. I attended this event back in October 2009, to see and talk to an impressive line-up of speakers, all focused on – what else – Chickamauga.

The event was a success, and raised $7,500, which the conference has donated to the Friends of the Raymond Battlefield association. If you don’t know, Raymond was a small but important engagement of the Vicksburg Campaign. The Rebel defenders were Gregg’s Brigade, later to become Chickamauga veterans.

To see more on Raymond, try this link:

http://friendsofraymond.org/

Tactics: Wilder’s Brigade

Most students of the war have heard of John T. Wilder and his mounted infantry. The story of the conception, conversion, and equipping of the brigade is well known and need not be discussed in detail again. Suffice to say that Rosecrans, short of cavalry going into the spring of 1863, liked Wilder’s idea to convert his brigade to mounted infantry by confiscating local livestock, and arming them with repeating weapons of some sort for added firepower. These proved ultimately to be Spencer rifles, tubular magazine-fed seven shot repeating arms that Wilder originally personally guaranteed loans for the purchase of, until the Federal government agreed to pay.

The genesis of the idea probably did not come from Wilder, however – though he certainly took credit for it later. In January, 1863, shortly after the battle of Stone’ s River, General Rosecrans informed the War Department that he was in the process of organizing a series of light battalions of elite troops, one for each brigade, hand-picked for bravery and combat skills. The brigades were supposed to prepare “rolls of honor,” naming individuals who had performed well in the fight, and the elites would be further picked from those rolls. Rosecrans intended that these elite battalions be mounted and armed with either repeating or revolving rifles. They would serve as scouts on the march, but unlike cavalry, dismount and function as elite combat troops on the battlefield.

Like the Confederate skirmish battalions that evolved in both the eastern and western theaters, these elite troops would be excused normal fatigue and camp duties so they had extra time to train. In addition, Rosecrans thought that he could use them to better counter Rebel raiders while the Federal forces were inactive, this sparing the need for so many scattered infantry garrisons that drained his army of combat power at the cutting edge.

Rosecrans’ idea was quashed by Halleck, primarily because the Federal government lacked the legal authority to establish these units from volunteer forces. (The Confederacy circumvented this legal objection by passing a specific law allowing the creation of these battalions in April, 1862.) But clearly, Wilder’s brigade – and the 39th Indiana, also re-equipped on this model – bore many of the same characteristics as Rosecrans’ Elites.

As an aside, Wilder and the 39th Indiana gave Rosecrans approximately 3,000 troops in six regiments. If his first plan had been implemented (assuming that enough weapons could be found, a big if) he would have created 12 to 15,000 elites in thirty battalions. I suspect that their effect on subsequent operations would have been profound.

While the 39th Indiana eventually became full-fledged cavalry – renamed as the 8th Indiana Cavalry in October 1863 – Wilder’s men resisted the notion that they were cavalry of any sort. They eschewed sabers or other cavalry accoutrements. They dismounted to engage wherever possible. In 1863, they carried early model Spencer rifles, not the later carbines, and those rifles lacked the cut-off that allowed a soldier to load a single cartridge into the chamber without having to empty the magazine or withdraw the tube. The cut-off would be a huge boon to later troops, as it allowed men to both fight from horseback much more easily, and to preserve the full firepower of the magazine for critical moments while still maintaining methodical single shots as needed.

However, Wilder’s troops learned quickly to exploit their still-significant firepower advantage over muzzle-loaders. Initially, they drilled as regular line infantry, in two ranks, shoulder to shoulder. This changed quickly. After the war, Wilder himself noted that in combat, the regiments instead formed a single line, with each man spaced about a yard apart. He preferred close fire, engaging at a hundred yards or so – and reserving full fire until the enemy was brutally close. Then, Wilder noted, the Federals emptied their magazines in a burst of fire that overwhelmed and shattered Rebel lines.

This is the kind of fire Manigault’s men ran into on September 20th as they reached the vicinity of the Widow Glenn Cabin. As they ascended the rise just west of the house (by then on fire) they met Wilder’s bluecoats coming up the other side of the small ridge, and described the Yankee fire as a veritable storm of lead.

Wilder’s preferred formation could best be described as a reinforced skirmish line. Far denser than a textbook skirmish line, formed in two ranks about 5 yards apart, and with five yards also separating each man, Wilder’s line had at two to three times as many men per yard – and of course, those Spencers. In addition to being more than a match for a conventional battleline in firepower, Wilder’s formation also helped reduce losses. A shoulder-to-shoulder formation was just a much more vulnerable target in a firefight, and it showed. At Chickamauga, despite hard fighting over all three days, the brigade reported 122 losses out of 2283 engaged – 5%. Average losses for most regiments, by contrast, ran 20-30%, with the highest topping 50%.

In postwar manuals, both American and European, the use of breechloading and magazine weapons would increasingly allow infantry to adopt looser lines akin to Wilder’s. In 1867, Emory Upton’s A New System of Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, Adapted to American Typography and Improved Fire-Arms called for use of very similar deployments.

The young soldiers from Illinois and Indiana who comprised the Lightning Brigade were confident, tough, and hardened by war. By the time of Chickamauga, they had the habit of victory, dominating their opponents in dozens of small engagements. I want to close with one anecdote, not of combat, but of an encounter on September 18th, that I think reflects this confidence, and also war’s impact on soldiers in general.

Before dawn on September 19th, Francis Carlisle of Company D, 42nd Indiana was sent to man a picket post in the yard of an abandoned log house on the east side of Chickamauga Creek, down near Glass Mill. He and his partners replaced men from the 17th Indiana, one of Wilder’s Regiments. A dead civilian lay sprawled on the porch. The civilian had been killed by a member of the 17th. The story as told Carlisle was that the man had rushed out of his house upon their arrival the day before, insisting “that no ‘Damned Yankee’ could come in his house.” The Federals pointed out the obvious, that they both outnumbered and outgunned him, and demanded that the civilian give up. Foolishly, he refused, saying “he would not surrender to any ‘Damned Yankees.’” At that time” continued Carlisle, “he was on the North porch, and one of the 17th Boys fired, killing him instantly.” The rest of the family fled, leaving only the anonymous corpse crumpled on the porch for Carlisle to contemplate as the sun rose.

Attention, Battalion! Advance, Firing!

Christmas is over. I lived. Not as hectic a season, even, as I have seen in the past. Thanks for your forebearance, and now, back to 1863…

The cliche, of course, is that the Civil War was fought with modern weapons and Napoleonic tactics.

The reality, of course, is a bit more complex.

I won’t spend a lot of time discussing the evolution of infantry tactics, the rifle-musket range problem, and all the attendant side-streams those discussions lead into – at least all in this one post. In fact, the pre-war theorists thought they had largely solved the problem of the rifle-musket through adaptations in tactics, using both looser, more flexible formations and the simple expedient of speed. March faster, get shot at less over the same distance.

But we know that by 1863, tactics were adapting from the bottom up as much as from the top down. Like all wars, the men on the ground reacted to match the conditions they faced, sometimes at the expense of any book.

One aspect of Chickamauga that I find really fascinating is when I turn over documentary evidence of tactical evolution in the primary sources. Often it’s just a casual, off the cuff reference: easily missed if one weren’t watching for it. Private Henry Dillman of the 31st Indiana, for example, restricted his discussion of his regiment’s fighting on September 19th to one line: “The 31st fought in her accustomed way,” he noted the next day, “lying down.”

Prone, that is – not a formation called for much in Casey or Hardee. But Dillman tells us that not only did the 31st fight that way on that fateful Saturday afternoon, that’s the way they usually fought. In fact, there are lots of references to troops going prone in other regiments, and on both sides, as well. Perhaps it seems obvious today – when folks are shooting at you, it pays to keep your head down, but going prone put men with muzzleloaders at a disadvantage when it came time to reload, and it was not a technique favored on the drill field.

We also have Brigadier General William B. Hazen’s observation in his OR report, noting the difference in casualties his brigade suffered in the fights on September 19th and 20th. On the 19th, they stood in the open, slugging it out with Cheatham’s Rebels in Brock Field. On the 20th, his men piled up rocks, dirt and fence rails into breastworks. On Saturday, he lost nearly 400 men. On Sunday? 13. Guess who would be fighting from works from now on.

But I mention these things only in passing.

In addition to the above pragmatism, there were some folks in the army who were thinking more deeply about the interrelationship of firepower, formation, and movement. And I believe they were allowed to pursue those ideas in the Army of the Cumberland because William Starke Rosecrans was open to new ideas. Two of these men were John T. Wilder and a man whom I’ve already discussed, August Willich. I intend to discuss Wilder at a later date. This essay is really about Willich, and something called “advance firing.”

Advance Firing was Willich’s own solution to the problem of advancing over contested ground. Typically, stationary infantry could fire 3 rounds a minute. Advancing troops had to cross the killing ground quickly and close with the enemy. When smoothbore ranges really limited infantry fights to 50 or 100 yards, defenders might rip off one good or two ragged volleys before that moment of closure. Rifles opened the range, and theorists, in turn, increased the rate of closure for advancing troops by doubling the pace.

Willich found this answer unsatisfactory. Instead, he decided that it would be better to incorporate fire and maneuver while advancing. In the spring of 1863, having returned from Libby Prison, he brought with him a new idea, described here by a member of the 125th Ohio:

“’Advance, firing.’ In that movement, the files doubled up, making four ranks, leaving intervals through which the rear rank passed, running rapidly forward a few paces, halting, firing and dropping to the ground to load, the next rank meantime passing still farther to the front to deliver its fire, and so on in succession.”

The result was a methodical advance combined with a wall of fire, delivering a volley from one quarter of the attacking force every ten or fifteen seconds while still sustaining a measured forward progress. The result, if executed properly, must have disrupted defenders, interfered with their own reloading, and likely was devastating, especially against an unprepared opponent. Willich claimed to have invented it, though it is possible that he instead adapted it from some German technique learned in his youth. I have found no reference to it in other armies, except for one interesting notation: German Jaegers in the American Revolution apparently had a specialized street-fighting drill that also used four ranks advancing in succession. I’ve never found an actual description or manual outlining the Jaeger drill, however – just hints.

Another odd thing about this formation is that it was used (as far as I have discovered) in only two brigades in the Army of the Cumberland – Willich’s 1/2/20, and Harker’s 3/1/21. I can’t find a reference as to where Harker’s men might have acquired the skill, but acquire it they did, and used it to rout Robertson’s Texans on September 20th. Willich’s men used it most prominently at Liberty Gap, in June, 1863, and in driving Cheatham’s line on September 19th. In all three cases it was a great success, at least on the immediate tactical level.

So why didn’t this formation catch on to other commands? One reason: Rosecrans lost his job as a result of the defeat at Chickamauga, and George Thomas took over. In the fall of 1863 Willich was ordered to stop employing or training “Advance Firing” and go back to the standard Casey’s manual. Thomas was a great commander, in my opinion, and a superb soldier – but not an innovator, at least in things like tactics.

Interestingly enough, after the war, when a number of army officers were seeking a new tactical paradigm incorporating the increasing use of breech loading rifles among the infantry, they also went to looser lines and successive ‘waves’ of advance, alternately firing and moving forward – all reminiscent of Willich’s idea, though also, obviously, based on the idea of reinforced skirmish line movement.

Advance firing remains a footnote in the history of the war, but to me, an intriguing one. In a future post, I intend to discuss some other aspects of the way the two armies fought at Chickamauga, either by or in spite of “the book.”

Sorry for the delay…

Folks,

Sorry to have been so inactive, here. December is usually a time for me to slip into lurk mode, as my day job ramps up. I run a delivery company in Chicago, and as any delivery guy can tell you, December is the crazy time. Gift baskets galore, right now, 6 days a week. For a season of peace, Christmas certainly makes some customers frantic.:)

Things you stumble upon…

A few years ago, I went to Sunbury Ohio (jut north of Columbus) for a horse show. My wife rides, and was in the regional finals.

While there, I had some free time, and took a morning to explore the local connections with General Rosecrans.

William Starke Rosecrans was born on September 6th, 1819, in Delaware County, Ohio. His father’s farm was on Little Taylor Run. The House is long gone. We know the rest of the story: West Point, army officer, Mexican War, Inventor, and then Civil War General. Had circumstances been even slightly different at Chickamauga, it is possible that schools would teach about the Rosecrans administration instead of the Grant or Garfield presidencies.

Postwar, after a stint as Ambassador to Mexico (From which Grant removed him in 1869) Rosecrans was most famous for his time in the U.S. Congress, from 1880 to 1885, as a representative from California.

Rosecrans bought a ranch in California, in present-day Redondo Beach, and retired there in 1889 – he was also restored to the rank of Brigadier General, USA, and placed on the retired list at this time. He died there 10 years later, in 1898, and lay in state in Los Angeles.

In 1902, a joint session of congress voted to transport his body east, so he could be interred at Arlington.

No statue of Rosecrans exists today. The Society of the Army of the Cumberland memorialized General Thomas in Washington DC, and there was talk of a similar effort for Rosecrans, which came to naught. At Chickamauga, of course, no generals have statues; and Rosecrans’ other battlefields were not parks until later.

However, there is an interesting monument to his birthplace. I stumbled across a reference to it in the Sunbury public library, and promptly set out to locate the place. I found it along (fittingly enough) Rosecrans Road, marking the site of the original family farm. It was placed by the American Legion in 1940, with a rejuvenation in the past few years.

I attend a wargame convention at Columbus every year (Origins, for those of you who care) and try to make a point of visiting the General during my trip.

I wonder how many others have visited the site.

One Casualty

Merritt J. Simonds joined the 42nd Illinois Infantry on August 4th, 1862. He enlisted in Company K, a new recruit among old hands. His first combat was Stone’s River, where the 42nd lost 161 men out of about 350 engaged.

Here are two pictures of Merritt, one taken before his enlistment and a second taken in the summer of 1863. the strains of war and campaigning are clearly evident in the latter.

At Chickamauga, the 42nd first entered action late on September 19th, attacking through Vinyard Field only to be repulsed with heavy loss. At about Noon on September 20th, the 42nd – along with the rest of Sheridan’s Division – was moving northeast past the Widow Glenn house, hurriedly moving into action. They were struck by Hindman’s Division, and faced another desperate engagement. Within a short time, the Federals were driven from the field. Again their losses were fierce: 143 lost out of 305 engaged.

Merritt Simonds was one of those casualties. Below are his diary entries for the days following his wound.

Sunday 20th
“In the morning we are relieved and go back about a mile on a high hill Stay here until about 11 O’clock when we have to go into the fight on the double quick. the fight rages with fury. I am struck on the right leg just above the knee, shatters the bone some. I try to get off the field but cannot…I lay here until night the rebs promise to take me off but do not.”

Monday 21st
“The rebs carry Off their wounded and bury their dead, but do not take us off. We lay here suffering from the sun and for water, the rebs give us some blankets and water, We lay here all day suffering a great deal.”

Tuesday 22nd
“We passed a restless night do not know whether our enemies intend to take us off or not. God help us to endure it. His will be done whether we live or die.”

Wednesday 23rd
“We have lain here now three nights and nearly four days and no signs of relief although the rebs continue to promise us. We have to lie on our backs all the time which makes it very hard on the rough ground but we will put our trust in God and abide the consequences…”

Thursday 24th
“Some of our men and a Doctor come to see us today. We are removed away from the dead bodies around us. I learn with sorrow that Sherwin [King]was killed. Shot through the head while at the post of duty. I hope to God he was prepared. My leg is very swollen and painful.”

Simonds laid there two more days, until he was finally removed to a Confederate field hospital the next Saturday, the 26th of September. On Wednesday the 30th, Simonds was allowed to return to his own lines with hundreds of other badly wounded men, transported in an improvised ambulance train to Union hospitals in Chattanooga. He was in desperate condition. On October 8th he wrote a note to his father, describing his ordeal and his condition, but still expecting to recover. His leg took a turn for the worse, however.

“Gen. Host. No. 2
Chattanooga Tenn
October 27th 1863

Dear Father

Since I last wrote I have been growing worse, my leg is now mortifying above the knee and the Dr’s say I cannot live more than two days at the longest. You must not take this to heart but look to a higher source for comfort, for it is God’s will and I feel resigned to my fate. “

Merritt died on October 29th, as a subsequent letter from messmate George Wright revealed. He was buried in Chattanooga.

Dr. William Glenn Robertson has taken many classes of soldiers to the regimental marker for the 42nd Illinois, there just north of the Wilder Tower, in the course of his staff rides. It is worth a moment to reflect, as we discuss tactics and generalship, revere one commander or revile another, on who pays the price when armies collide.

The Institute will be heard from…

Recently I went back to VMI. It has been a while since I was there last, especially to look around. Everything’s different, and yet nothing has changed, if you know what I mean. There’s a new barracks (Cell Block C – cadet humor is one of those unchanging items) where the PX and student center used to be, but overall, the place seemed frozen in time.

When I was last in Preston Library the stacks were dark, metal enclosed spaces. Now the floors are open, airy, light and carpeted. The library was completely redone in the late 1990s. I was there to do some research on the battle of New Market. VMI has a premiere collection of source material on the subject, as you might imagine, and housed in a proper archives, to boot. A change for the better, I think.

VMI’s Civil War Past is traditionally associated with Virginia, and Lee’s Army. 13 of the 15 colonels in Pickett’s Division on July 3, 1863, were Institute Grads, or so goes the legend – I confess I haven’t looked it up. 21 Alumni or faculty – including the most famous, Stonewall Jackson – became Confederate Generals.

But there is a Chickamauga connection. I know of three, in fact.

The first is Colonel Alfred J. Vaughan, Jr. Vaughan graduated in 1851, standing 15th out of a class of 29; he was a well traveled civil engineer before the war. Having settled in Mississippi, he rapidly recruited a company for the war, but not finding a place in a Mississippi Regiment, he took his nascent command into Tennessee, where they filled out the ranks of the 13th Tennessee Infantry. Vaughan was soon elected Lt. Col., and then promoted to full Colonel that winter. He was wounded at Shiloh, fought at Perryville and Stones River, and led his command into the fight at Chickamauga. On the night of the 19th, Preston Smith’s Brigade (to which the 13th Tennessee belonged) supported Cleburne’s division in a night attack and stumbled into the 77th Pennsylvania. Smith was killed in the ensuing confusion. Vaughan assumed command, eventually rising to Brigadier.

Lieutenant Colonel Abraham Fulkerson commanded the 63rd Tennessee. He was in the VMI class of 1857, graduating 12th out of 23; and had also been wounded at Shiloh while serving with the 19th Tennessee. He subsequently helped raised the 63rd and was elected Lt. Col.; effectively running the regiment due to the ill health of the actual Colonel, Richard G. Fain. Fulkerson saw no action on the 19th, but was given the grim task of assaulting the Snodgrass Hill portion of Horseshoe Ridge late on the 20th. His regiment was cut to pieces by the controlled fire of Harker’s Brigade, supported by Hazen and Frank Smith’s Battery I, 4th US Artillery. The Tennesseans lost 48% of those engaged, including Fulkerson, badly wounded in the left arm.

the last connection comes with William Young Conn Humes, also class of 51. He was a distinguished graduate, standing 2nd, and was a lawyer in Memphis before the war. His light would not shine until later in the war; at the time of Chickamauga he was serving as chief of artillery to Major General Joe Wheeler, though in November he was given a brigade, and eventually rose to Major General.

I suspect there are some more VMI men in the ranks, serving on staffs and the like, but I have not come across them yet. Perhaps in time…