Western Theater Historians Association

Last weekend I was away at the annual meeting of this esteemed group. I’ve been to several of these conferences now, and I’ve found them both enlightening and very good fun. Among the members are many well-respected authors and historians; a mix of both academic and non-academic students of the war. Organized by Mike Ballard and John Marzelak, this group has been meeting for about ten years now, in various locations.

This year we went to Corinth, Mississippi, a reprise of an earlier trip (which happened before I joined.) As you may know, Corinth has a new interpretive center, which has helped to organize and interpret the many scattered sites relating to both the battle and occupation of Corinth during the war. I’ve been to Corinth before, usually in conjuction with a Shiloh trip, but this was the first time where Corinth was the principle focus of my touring.

The Conference opened on Thursday evening with a reception at the Interpretive center and group dinner at a local restaurant. Friday is the centerpiece, with a daylong discussion of various topics relating to the war, with a focus, obviously, on the Western Theater. The discussions are informal, with no presenting of papers or the like. There are a lot of heavy hitters in the room, however, so I find the talks fascinating.

Saturday is usually reserved for touring. We took a look at the battle of Corinth in the morning, and after lunch we did go to Shiloh for a couple of hours. It was on the way home for me, how could I not?

Corinth is important to Chickamauga, I think, mainly for its effect on the career of William Starke Rosecrans. Success at Corinth propelled Rosecrans into command of the Army of the Ohio (soon to be the Army of the Cumberland) less than a month later. The battle of Corinth was fought on October 3rd and 4th; Rosecrans replaced Don Carlos Buell on October 27th. I suspect that without the signal success of Corinth, Rosecrans might not have been tapped for the new job.

Corinth (along with the related action at Iuka in September) also soured relations between Rosecrans and Ulysses S. Grant. So while it set the stage for Rosecrans’ rapid rise, it also laid the groundwork for an equally rapid fall. It would be Grant’s decision that Rosecrans should go in the wake of the defeat at Chickamauga. While I believe that Grant’s decision was in part fueled by personal reasons, it did elevate George Thomas to army command as well.

The Grant-Rosecrarns-Thomas triangle has been studied often by historians, with varying conclusions. Each man has their cheering section. Rosecrans and Thomas fans tend to assail Grant unmercifully, characterizing him as a malicious schemer eaten up by jealousy. I don’t go that far. I think Grant had tough choices to make and not everyone was going to be happy with all of those choices. I do think that Grant was mistaken in some of his character judgements. On the question of who ultimately should have had command of the Army of the Cumberland, and did a better job, I am also not completely certain: I think both Rosecrans and Thomas have pros and cons to consider.

It is clear, however, that before Iuka, Rosecrans and Grant had a much more positive working relationship; had that lasted, Rosecrans might not have been relieved.

http://westerntheaterhistorians.org/sections/Corinth2011/CorinthPix/index.html

The Army of the Cumberland’s ‘Elite Battalions’

In January 1863, Major General William Starke Rosecrans had an idea. The Army of the Cumberland had just finished what seemed like the fight of its life, a desperate struggle fought over the new year, at Stone’s River. Rosecrans set out to attack Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, and was instead himself attacked.

The two armies were evenly matched. Each numbered roughly 40,000 men, and losses were more than 25%. Despite near disaster, the Federals rallied, held off Bragg’s Confederates, and then repulsed a second effort two days later. Eventually Bragg retreated, converting a stalemate into a Union victory, though one defined only by the narrowest of margins. Coming in the wake of terrible news from Fredericksburg in mid-December, not surprisingly the Administration and the whole of the North embraced Stone’s River as a Union triumph. Congratulatory telegrams pouring into Rosecrans’ headquarters. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton informed Rosecrans that “There is nothing you can ask within my power to grant to yourself or your heroic command that will not be cheerfully given.”

Rosecrans had always been a man of grand ideas and great passions; the Secretary of War’s apparent blank check appeared to give Rosecrans free reign. In the early months of 1863, he asked a great many things of the War Department, including, among other things, direct authority over the Union Navy vessels then patrolling the Cumberland River. Most of the things Rosecrans wanted he would not get, and his relationship with Washington DC soured over time, until Stanton’s promise seemed a hollow one.

One such idea merits some additional investigation. Most of Rosecrans’ concerns had to do with the tenuous nature of his supply lines, and how to deal with the raiders and guerillas infesting Tennessee and Kentucky. The all-important Louisville and Nashville Railroad was Rosecrans’ lifeline. Without it his army would starve. He also found himself desperately short of cavalry. Rosecrans might outnumber Bragg’s army in overall strength, but the Rebels had a lot more horsemen, and 1862 had been a good year for them. Confederate raids by Forrest, Armstrong, Morgan and others had badly disrupted Union supply lines across the whole of the department.

Hence Rosecrans’ latest brainstorm. In the wake of Stones River, Rosecrans decided that one way to inspire his army was to have each regiment select the bravest of the men who had proved themselves in the recent fight, and publically acknowledge their valor. On February 14, 1863, General Rosecrans published General Order #19, proposing the creation of a “Roll of Honor” to “establish a method of pointing out to this army and the nation those officers and soldiers of this command who shall distinguish themselves by bravery in battle, by courage, enterprise, and soldierly conduct.” This roll was to be kept from company to brigade level and compiled at each division’s headquarters.

Next, Rosecrans wanted each brigade in the army to hand-pick men from these regimental rolls and assign them to a new and unusual unit. Rosecrans detailed his intentions to General-in-Chief Halleck on February 1st. From this roll, each regiment would supply all the named privates, one officer, and five sergeants or corporals to form an elite battalion for each brigade. Additionally, and rashly, he “promise[d] them the best of arms when I can get them, and will mount them for rapid field movement, like flying artillery….We must create military ardor,” he concluded. When organized, this concept would add another thirty or so mounted battalions, or roughly 6,000 men, to Rosecrans’ mounted arm.

For the United States Army in the 19th Century, this was a radical idea. It was also illegal. Rosecrans had no authority to raise new units or add formations to the existing establishment; and he was infringing on the various States’ rights to raise and officer new commands. Moreover, the weapons Rosecrans wanted to give them were repeaters. Seven-shot Spencer or Sixteen-shot Henry rifles, if possible; Colt Revolving rifles if he had to settle for less. A veritable bombardment of telegrams were soon headed off to Washington, as Rosecrans pressed his case with his usual zeal. “You can’t have all the best weapons” came the response from an exasperated Henry Halleck. Other armies needed them also.

Most people will doubtless recognize this idea in the form of Colonel John T. Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, who did eventually mount themselves and acquire Spencers. But the elite battalion idea died aborning, and would never be revived. Interestingly enough, the Rebel army did something like this when the Confederate Congress passed legislation in April 1862, authorizing the formation of sharpshooter battalions to be created at the brigade level. the Federals, however, were less inclined to such tactical experiments.

Or did it die entirely? The Rolls of Honor were published, and while the elite battalions were never offiically created, there are intriguing references in the regimental literature to suggest that some of Rosecrans other measures were taken.
One such example can be found in Chaplain John J. Hight’s History of the Fifty-Eighth Regiment of Indiana Volunteer Infantry (Princeton Indiana, 1895). On page 337 there is a picture of Sergeant Gilbert Armstrong, of Company E. Armstrong is holding a Henry Rifle, and in a footnote, the author informs us that the rifle was “presented to him by some of his friends in the regiment, for bravery shown in the battle of Stones River.”

The recognition afforded Armstrong sounds very much like what Rosecrans intended, down to and including the distribution of the most modern weapons. It suggests that in some regiments, at least, Rosecrans’ idea had begun to bear fruit, even if it was later quashed by higher authority. There are other passing references to Henry Rifles in Chickamauga accounts, either as captures by Confederates, or made by Federals in regimental histories, memoirs and the like.

Armstrong’s rifle was captured by the Confederates, on September 20th, 1863. Sergeant Armstrong was actually wounded in the chest on September 19th, but passed his rifle to Lieutenant H. J. Barnett of Company F. Unfortunately, Barnett was wounded on the 20th, and the rifle fell into enemy hands. (See the Stones River National Battlefield website for more on the Armstrong rifle: http://www.nps.gov/stri/historyculture/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=230330 )

How many weapons were issued, and to how many different regiments? So far, I have been unable to find that information out. A number of them obviously made their way into the hands of various infantrymen, but there is no official record of them being issued. The Union Army Quarterly Ordnance Returns (Q.O.R.) do not even have a category for either Henry or Spencer repeaters. The 58th’s returns for March or June, 1863 do not show any such weapons on hand. Armstrong’s rifle, and any others in the regiment, were ‘off the books.’

Nor is there any concrete evidence that these well-armed men were routinely detailed as skirmishers or sharpshooters. They might well have been, given their extra firepower, but I have yet to see any proof of any more formal tactical role.

The idea, however, is fascinating to think about. Wilder’s Brigade proved to be very effective, but there virtually of the men in an entire command were armed with Spencers and could deliver massed firepower. Under Rosecrans’ initial concept, each brigade would have a battalion of heavily armed skirmishers, but with only 200 or so rifles per brigade, would they have had the same impact? Would the concept have evolved over time? Each corps would have had ten or twelve such battalions to call upon, which would have given the Federals at least three brigades similar to Wilder’s to employ tactically. Another question worth asking is whether or not Wilder would have been allowed to mount and equip his brigade with repeaters if Rosecrans had been allowed instead to form his elite battalions? Did Rosecrans see Wilder’s request as a way around the restraints of army bureaucracy?

I continue to look for references to repeaters in the Army of the Cumberland. If anyone comes across one, please let me know about it. It’s a subject worth some additional exploration.