A Lost Confederate: Marcus J. Wright

Some careers are less glamorous than others.

Marcus J. Wright was one whom fame largely overlooked. He commanded a brigade in only two battles with the army of Tennessee, Chickamauga and Chattanooga. In each case, he was placed in a difficult situation largely by circumstances outside his control. He did not do poorly, but neither did he win plaudits.

The 30 year old Wright entered the war as Lieutenant Colonel of the 154th (Senior) Tennessee infantry – a pre-war militia unit that kept its old number, along with the “Senior” appellation to reinforce the militia connection, to distinguish it from mere wartime volunteers. The 154 was from Memphis and West Tennessee; Wright himself was from Purdy, just a few miles from what would become the field at Shiloh.

In fact, he led the 154th at Shiloh, assuming command after brigade commander Bushrod Johnson was wounded and Colonel Preston Smith stepped up to that command. On Sunday April 6th Wright was hit in the knee by a spent ball, taking a minor if painful wound, but nevertheless kept the field through the end of the two day battle. He earned considerable praise from superiors for his conduct during the fight.

That summer, as Confederate regiments re-organized for the duration of the war, many units also voted in new slates of officers. Wright apparently was not voted back; instead he took a job as Assistant Adjutant General under Major General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham in July, 1862. He would serve on Cheatham’s staff until November, fighting at Perryville on October 8th.

In November, as the Army of Tennessee fetched up at Murfreesboro, Wright was promoted to full colonel and sent to McMinnville, Tennessee – there to take charge of the post and the camp of instruction. He’d been post commander once before, at Columbus Kentucky, between January and March of 1862. At McMinnville his duties were administrative. He missed the battle of Murfreesboro in the meantime.

Wright had hopes for both additional promotions and a return to field command. He had a powerful patron in the form of Tennessee’s wartime Governor, Isham G. Harris, who embarked on an ambitious letter writing campaign on behalf of the young colonel. Harris promised Wright that the War Department in Richmond would be besieged on Wright’s behalf, writing letters under his own name and for Frank Cheatham to sign, urging Wright’s promotion. The effort was successful: Wright was appointed Brigadier in January, to date from December 13, 1862, confirmed by the Confederate Congress on April 22nd.

In January Wright returned to the Army of Tennessee, newly decorated with General’s braid, and eager for command. For two weeks he led the fabled Orphan Brigade, until the powers that be decided that a native Kentuckian should actually be given that job, for obvious political and morale reasons. Brigadier General Benjamin H. Helm replaced Wright on January 29th.

In the meantime, Brigadier General Samuel S. Donelson had taken ill, so ill that he would die later that spring, and the vacancy his incapacitation created seemed ideal for Wright. Donelson had commanded a Tennessee brigade in Cheatham’s Division. Wright took command on February 7th.
The brigade objected. Several officers expected that Colonel John Savage of the 8th Tennessee would get the job instead, and Wright’s arrival was a most unwelcome surprise. To make matters worse, Savage already viewed Wright as something of a political rival during their ante-bellum years, and now saw Wright’s promotion as an attack on himself. Eventually, Savage resigned in angry protest, and would harbor a grudge against Wright for many years.

Wright commanded the brigade through the summer of 1863, participating in the Tullahoma campaign, but seeing no action. He led his command into the attack at Chickamauga on September 19th. Overmatched and outflanked, Wright fell back just as Clayton’s Brigade was coming up. The tactical problems on the 19th were no fault of Wright’s; All five brigades in Cheatham’s division were poorly placed and suffered similar reverses. On September 20th, Wright’s men participated in the final successful attack on Kelly Field at the close of the battle.

If the brigade’s officers were critical of their new brigadier, that criticism was muted. One did note that he sent three different couriers to find Wright during the climax of the engagement on the 19th to no avail, but Wright earned neither censure nor special praise for his conduct on the field.

Two months later, Wright commanded the brigade at the battle of Chattanooga. His brigade had been detached, defending Cleveland, Tennessee, when Bragg hastily transferred it back to Missionary Ridge on November 24th to oppose Sherman’s crossing of the Tennessee River. On the afternoon of the 24th, Wright was given the impossible task of marching down the south Chickamauga Creek to the river bank in order to prevent Sherman – with three divisions already across – from effecting a lodgment on the south bank of the Tennessee.

Near dark, Wright’s men stumbled into Federals, and after some skirmishing, soon withdrew to a nearby hill. That night, they retreated further, to a position east of Missionary Ridge to guard Bragg’s northern flank. They were not further engaged. At 2:00 a.m. on the 25th, however, Marcus Wright turned command over to Colonel Anderson of the 8th Tennessee – Wright reported that he was sick with a “severe chill.” Historian Peter Cozzens has suggested that Wright lost his nerve.

If in fact Wright was showing the white feather, no official censure seems to have come from it. However, Chattanooga would be his last time in command of a brigade. In March, 1864, Wright was ordered to Atlanta, to take command of that post. He would spend the rest of the war in various administrative commands. His brigade was commanded by John C. Carter until it was broken up later in the fall of 64. Carter himself died at Franklin, one of the six Confederate Generals who lost their lives there.

One interesting facet of Wright’s career is that by the spring of 64, he was a confidante of Bragg’s, who wrote him several intimate letters expressing the ex-army commander’s dissatisfaction and vituperation with senior officers – especially Frank Cheatham. Wright owed his promotion to Harris’ and Cheatham’s influence, and could be expected to be loyal to them, not Bragg. Did Cheatham know of Wright’s relationship with Bragg? Did relations cool between Marcus Wright and Frank Cheatham as a result? There is little evidence either way, but Wright’s continued allegiance to Bragg could not have helped.

After the war, Wright returned to Memphis and practiced law, until he won a plum appointment: In 1878 he was made the official Confederate agent for collection of records to be included in the publication of the massive Official Records of the Civil War.” He did so assiduously for the next 39 years, until he retired in 1917. His role in collecting these records gave him unique access to the story of the war. He greatly influenced the history of the conflict not only by his work with the official records, but also by writing for other publications as well.

Still, Wright has left few footprints in the history of the war. He has no biography, for instance, and in most accounts he merits only a few words. A large number of questions about his relationships with subordinates and superiors remain.

I found two books to be especially helpful in providing some clues to Wright’s career:

Sam Davis Elliott, Isham G. Harris Of Tennessee, 2010

Christopher Losson, Tennessee’s Forgotten Warriors: Frank Cheatham and his Confederate Division, 1989.

Advertisements

8 Responses to “A Lost Confederate: Marcus J. Wright”

  1. Marc Grad Says:

    Excellent post David. I really enjoy your blog. Keep up the good work!

  2. Jamie Gillum Says:

    Not a bad idea mentioning a little known general – however he was little known for a reason. No doubt his promotions came through from political channels, but he appointment to brigade command, espescially over Savage was absurd.

    He had never even led a regiment for more than a minute once before and it is clear he was suited merely for administrative positions. He conduct at Chickamauga was indeed a personal blunder. His brigade itself was hap-hazzardly deployed and it lost its own battery under command of Capt. Carnes due to Wirght’s negligence. The brigade found itself flanked on the left and it a perioous position due to his inability to recognize his position on the field of battle.

    The only thing that saved his men was the advance of Stewart’s men.

    At Chattanooga – Wright once again failed to understand the situation as he marched his men on the Union left flank directly into an ambush – while his men had not yet been ordered to load their rifles! As one veteran of the brigade put it:

    “We were marched right along into close contact with the enemy without heed to repeated warnings which were given to our commander. When the Eighth and Sixteenth Regiments got well into this part of the road a signal was given on the enemy’s left and a volley was poured into our ranks. General ——–[Wright] quickly turned his horse and gave order, ‘Get your men into line, Col. Anderson! I’ll go and order up the artillery.’ Whether he ever found the artillery he went back to order we never knew. The next we heard of him he was commanding the Post at Atlanta, a post we were willing he should fill, as it gave us a brigade commander.”
    Confederate Veteran, Vol. 1, p. 377.

    • Dave Powell Says:

      Wright faced a great deal of animosity from a certain faction of the brigade, both during and after the war, and this has colored history’s perception of him. Wright did not blunder at Chickamauga; he was instead placed in an impossible situation. His brigade advanced, unsupported, into a right-angled trap, formed by no less than three brigades of Federals. He was woefully overmatched, and no matter which way he faced, he was outlfanked. Henry Clayton’s Brigade followed his in this same position, and suffered much the same fate, including the heavy losses. Carnes’ Battery, while lost, probably saved the brigade from being badly overrun by Horatio Van Cleve’s division; it was a necessary sacrifice.

      If anyone could be called negligient, we’d have to blame Frank Cheatham, for allowing his divisional front to become so fragmented and failing to send any support to his right flank, or Bragg, for committing divisions into the fight one at a time for slaughter.

      Savage’s animosity was politically driven as well, and lasted for years after the war. The criticism directed at Wright mostly originates from political allies or followers of Savage, and should be taken with several grains of salt. Savage was a political opponent of Isham Harris’, and saw Wright’s appointment as a move against his own postwar political ambitions (which it almost certainly was.) Ironically, had Savage bided his time, he would have certainly ended up in command of the brigade.

      Wright’s appointment to command the post of Atlanta, BTW, should not be seen as a demotion; he instead replaced a series of officers whom had been found wanting in that position.

      • Jamie Gillum Says:

        I would agree that Wright faced a great deal of animosity from the brigade, but that was likely much more than just a faction. In fact, nearly the whole division was astounded at Wright’s appointment. Not because M. J. Wright was being promoted, but because a hard chargin’ Colonel with extensive combat experience – a regimental commander since the war’s commencement and a tried veteran of the Cheat Mountain Campaign, Corinth, Perryville (where he was seriously wounded) and Murfreesboro – was being passed over by a no name.

        Only a few months after his resignation he was called on by the Tennesseans to raise another unit from Tennessee and a petition was signed by hundreds of officers in Cheatham’s Division. These included names outside of the division as well. Harris and Davis saw to it that it would not be done.

        Perhaps Wright never was given a situation with which he could prove his worth – but Savage was in impossible situations more than once. At Perryville his regiment was flanked by two batteries and a brigade of infantry. His regiment lost heavily, but helped to assure the collapse of the Federal left flank by pinning the enemy down and killing the batterymen and singlehandedly forcing back two regiments of infantry. Timely arrival of Maney’s Brigade ensured the success on their immediate right flank.

        At Murfreesboro the Sixteenth Tennessee again was placed in a crucial position. They advanced to “Hell’s Half Acre” and engaged Hazen’s men holding their position for more than two hours. These were both impossible situations – but the commander was present on the field and directing his men – aware of the situation and reacting when necessary.

        It is clear that Wright had no business being appointed to a position of such responsibility and whether or not the appointment should have gone to Savage is beside the point. Wright simply did not have the experience nor knowledge to assume brigade command, his asperations alone were not a good enough resume for most of the men – and blame for losses the units incurred should be placed squarely on the shoulders of the politicians that pushed his promotion – Harris specifically – and Wright’s own ambition.

        I can’t see blaming Cheatham for Wright’s misfortune at Chickamauga, but more likely Bragg as you have stated.

        Savage was actually pro-Union, however when Tennessee was obviously going to join the Confederacy – so was Savage. Savage’s greatest gripes about Harris, Davis and others that fanned the flames of war before the firing of a single shot was that he believed the two section’s differences could be worked out in the Supreme Court. He hated that certain politicians were pushing an unprepared south into war.

        I can’t say with certainty though that being appointed to command a post is not a demotion. It’s not likely that Hume R. Field or John C. Carter would have been placed in such a position having proven their worth in ways that meant success on the battlefield.

        On the field of battle, Wright proved nothing – ever. That’s likely why fame overlooked him. Administratively – there were likely few his equal – as he proved in his abilities to collect and organize Confederate records and reports.

  3. Bruce Allardice Says:

    Savage had reason to be outraged at Wright’s appointment. Besides the CW record, Savage had been a Lt. Col. in the Mexican War, and thus had the prewar experience Wright lacked. Certainly in the ordinary course of things Savage should have succeeded Donelson, having often led the brigade in Donelson’s absence. However, Savage was court-martialed and reprimanded for disobeyng orders in Feb. 1862, and several junior officers didn’t think highly of his intellect or honesty. He quarrelled with Donelson, too.
    One possible reason for Wright’s promotion is that his brother John was a Confederate Congressman.

  4. Chris Evans Says:

    There is some mention of Wright in the recent issue of ‘Blue & Gray Magazine’ about Missionary Ridge by Wiley Sword.

    It has a great quote by one of his soldiers that Wright pretty much disappeared from Missionary Ridge and the next thing they heard about him he was commanding the post at Atlanta.

    Chris.

  5. Ski Bankowski Says:

    Thank you for this information. It fills in a few holes for me and creates some new ones. GGandfather was in 16th Tennessee. Wonder if you follwed Wright to Dalton and I suppose to Mississippi.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: