Tactics: Wilder’s Brigade

Most students of the war have heard of John T. Wilder and his mounted infantry. The story of the conception, conversion, and equipping of the brigade is well known and need not be discussed in detail again. Suffice to say that Rosecrans, short of cavalry going into the spring of 1863, liked Wilder’s idea to convert his brigade to mounted infantry by confiscating local livestock, and arming them with repeating weapons of some sort for added firepower. These proved ultimately to be Spencer rifles, tubular magazine-fed seven shot repeating arms that Wilder originally personally guaranteed loans for the purchase of, until the Federal government agreed to pay.

The genesis of the idea probably did not come from Wilder, however – though he certainly took credit for it later. In January, 1863, shortly after the battle of Stone’ s River, General Rosecrans informed the War Department that he was in the process of organizing a series of light battalions of elite troops, one for each brigade, hand-picked for bravery and combat skills. The brigades were supposed to prepare “rolls of honor,” naming individuals who had performed well in the fight, and the elites would be further picked from those rolls. Rosecrans intended that these elite battalions be mounted and armed with either repeating or revolving rifles. They would serve as scouts on the march, but unlike cavalry, dismount and function as elite combat troops on the battlefield.

Like the Confederate skirmish battalions that evolved in both the eastern and western theaters, these elite troops would be excused normal fatigue and camp duties so they had extra time to train. In addition, Rosecrans thought that he could use them to better counter Rebel raiders while the Federal forces were inactive, this sparing the need for so many scattered infantry garrisons that drained his army of combat power at the cutting edge.

Rosecrans’ idea was quashed by Halleck, primarily because the Federal government lacked the legal authority to establish these units from volunteer forces. (The Confederacy circumvented this legal objection by passing a specific law allowing the creation of these battalions in April, 1862.) But clearly, Wilder’s brigade – and the 39th Indiana, also re-equipped on this model – bore many of the same characteristics as Rosecrans’ Elites.

As an aside, Wilder and the 39th Indiana gave Rosecrans approximately 3,000 troops in six regiments. If his first plan had been implemented (assuming that enough weapons could be found, a big if) he would have created 12 to 15,000 elites in thirty battalions. I suspect that their effect on subsequent operations would have been profound.

While the 39th Indiana eventually became full-fledged cavalry – renamed as the 8th Indiana Cavalry in October 1863 – Wilder’s men resisted the notion that they were cavalry of any sort. They eschewed sabers or other cavalry accoutrements. They dismounted to engage wherever possible. In 1863, they carried early model Spencer rifles, not the later carbines, and those rifles lacked the cut-off that allowed a soldier to load a single cartridge into the chamber without having to empty the magazine or withdraw the tube. The cut-off would be a huge boon to later troops, as it allowed men to both fight from horseback much more easily, and to preserve the full firepower of the magazine for critical moments while still maintaining methodical single shots as needed.

However, Wilder’s troops learned quickly to exploit their still-significant firepower advantage over muzzle-loaders. Initially, they drilled as regular line infantry, in two ranks, shoulder to shoulder. This changed quickly. After the war, Wilder himself noted that in combat, the regiments instead formed a single line, with each man spaced about a yard apart. He preferred close fire, engaging at a hundred yards or so – and reserving full fire until the enemy was brutally close. Then, Wilder noted, the Federals emptied their magazines in a burst of fire that overwhelmed and shattered Rebel lines.

This is the kind of fire Manigault’s men ran into on September 20th as they reached the vicinity of the Widow Glenn Cabin. As they ascended the rise just west of the house (by then on fire) they met Wilder’s bluecoats coming up the other side of the small ridge, and described the Yankee fire as a veritable storm of lead.

Wilder’s preferred formation could best be described as a reinforced skirmish line. Far denser than a textbook skirmish line, formed in two ranks about 5 yards apart, and with five yards also separating each man, Wilder’s line had at two to three times as many men per yard – and of course, those Spencers. In addition to being more than a match for a conventional battleline in firepower, Wilder’s formation also helped reduce losses. A shoulder-to-shoulder formation was just a much more vulnerable target in a firefight, and it showed. At Chickamauga, despite hard fighting over all three days, the brigade reported 122 losses out of 2283 engaged – 5%. Average losses for most regiments, by contrast, ran 20-30%, with the highest topping 50%.

In postwar manuals, both American and European, the use of breechloading and magazine weapons would increasingly allow infantry to adopt looser lines akin to Wilder’s. In 1867, Emory Upton’s A New System of Infantry Tactics, Double and Single Rank, Adapted to American Typography and Improved Fire-Arms called for use of very similar deployments.

The young soldiers from Illinois and Indiana who comprised the Lightning Brigade were confident, tough, and hardened by war. By the time of Chickamauga, they had the habit of victory, dominating their opponents in dozens of small engagements. I want to close with one anecdote, not of combat, but of an encounter on September 18th, that I think reflects this confidence, and also war’s impact on soldiers in general.

Before dawn on September 19th, Francis Carlisle of Company D, 42nd Indiana was sent to man a picket post in the yard of an abandoned log house on the east side of Chickamauga Creek, down near Glass Mill. He and his partners replaced men from the 17th Indiana, one of Wilder’s Regiments. A dead civilian lay sprawled on the porch. The civilian had been killed by a member of the 17th. The story as told Carlisle was that the man had rushed out of his house upon their arrival the day before, insisting “that no ‘Damned Yankee’ could come in his house.” The Federals pointed out the obvious, that they both outnumbered and outgunned him, and demanded that the civilian give up. Foolishly, he refused, saying “he would not surrender to any ‘Damned Yankees.’” At that time” continued Carlisle, “he was on the North porch, and one of the 17th Boys fired, killing him instantly.” The rest of the family fled, leaving only the anonymous corpse crumpled on the porch for Carlisle to contemplate as the sun rose.

17 Responses to “Tactics: Wilder’s Brigade”

  1. Marc Grad Says:

    Dave, what about the 21st Ohio? I know they didn’t have horses like Wilder and the 39th Ind, but did they have any special training like the others, or did they just have better weapons?

  2. davidpowell334 Says:


    Good question, and worthy of a post…

  3. Bryn Says:

    It is perhaps easy to overstate the effect of the Spencer.

    Wilder’s AAR stresses the impact of the enfilading fire from the flanking movement and the effect of the artillery. Bate’s AAR makes no mention of the fire being particularly heavy, and he gives the reason for defeat as the superior Federal numbers were able to move round his flanks at will.

    Wilder had 2,000 odd mounted infantry and 10 guns, Bate arrived with the 1st(37th) Georgia, 20th Tennessee, the brigade sharpshooters under Caswell and a 4 gun battery, 650 men all up. Even without the repeaters being a factor the Federals have a 3:1 advantage.

    The casualties are slightly overstated. The organisations on the field lost 132 in the 3 days they occupied that ground, and probably lost ca. 120 in their assaults on Wilder after a small deductions for casualties on the 25th and 26th. The casualty ratio is thus about 3:1 in the Federal favour, and is consistant with Lanchesters Linear Law. Thus in all probability the outcome would have been identical had Wilder been armed with normal rifle-muskets.

    Wilder himself seems to have changed his mind a considerable period after the battle, in 1907 he writes that it was due to the huge volume of fire the new rifles put out, but he is writing this after the effect of smokeless powder magazine rifles have altered warfare.

  4. Megan Says:

    Can someone please explain the regiments the Wilder Brigade had? Doing a history paper and I’m really confused about this brigade unit/company.

    • Dave Powell Says:

      Wilder’s Brigade consisted of the 92nd 98th and 123rd Illinois Infantry, the 17th and 72nd Indiana Infantry, and the 18th Indiana Battery.

  5. Megan Says:

    Thank you Dave! I appreciate it and I have one last question for anyone really. What books would you suggest to further understand this brigade? I’m already attempting to use the Official Records in the War of the Rebellion. Anything else? Thanks again!

    • Dave Powell Says:

      I would pick up Richard Baumgartner’s “Blue Lightning: Wilder’s Brigade at Chickamauga.” his bibliography will provide you with a ton of additional resources for different aspects of the brigade, as well as a first rate battle history of the command at Chickamauga. Dave Powell

  6. Michael Winner Says:

    What part did the 39th Indiana/8th Cavalry play at Chickamauga? I know they carried Spencer rifles but they were not part of Wilder’s Brigade, who were they attatched to?

    Thanks so much,

    • Dave Powell Says:


      The 39th were sem-independent, usually reporting directly to 20th Corps HQ. They belonged nominally to Willich’s Brigade, of Johnson’s 2nd Division, of that corps.

      Wilder often claimed that the idea to mount his brigade and arm it with spencers was his own, and took a great deal of credit for being more foward-thinking than the west pointers, but in fact the idea really originated with Rosecrans, and the existence of the 39th is more evidence of that. Rosecrans proposed arming and mounting a battalion from every brigade, and when that was turned down by Washington, he fell back on stop-gap measures. The 39th was one such.

      On the 17th, 18th, and 19th, the 39th screened the army’s southern flank, south of Glass Mill and down as far as Davis’ Crossroads. As the army closed to the north, they followed suit. On the 19th they were at Crawfish Spring, and assigned to watch Sheridan’s right flank – Sheridan was guarding Lee and Gordon’s Mill, and the last division to reach the fight.

      On the 20th, they were doing the same thing, only now Sheridan’s men had been moved north and west, to the vicinity of the Widow Glenn’s. This brought the 39th into contact with Wilder’s men, who were ordered to do the same thing, to “protect the right fighting flank of the army.”

      thus, they were involved in the same fight at the Glenn House (now the site of Wilder Tower) that Wilder’s Brigade was in, and tend to get lumped together as part of that brigade. They essentially joined Wilder’s brigade for the rest of the day, escorting a train back into chattanooga that night. On the 21st, they were moved to Missionary Ridge, where they skirmished with Forrest’s Cavalry.

      • Steve Mitchell Says:

        My ancestor joined the 39th/8th Indiana Cavalry in June 1863 and served with them until the end of the war. Where can I get the daily records of this unit so I can get more info on my ancestor?

      • Mike Winner Says:

        Can’t remember if I ever read this old post, but did now, thanks so much Dave!!
        Mike Winner

  7. John Bowyer Says:

    Enjoyed reading your posts.SUVCW Ben Harrison Camp #356 Camp Commander John Bowyer. Descendant of William T. Johnson,Co.D 17th IN Mounted Inf

  8. The American Civil War 150th Anniversary – September 9-15, 1863 | Clear Sight Says:

    […] Mills (ongoing), and Leet’s Tan-Yard/Rock Spring (PDF file) where US Colonel Wilder’s Lightning Brigade of mounted infantry give Confederates a desperate fight. There is also fighting on the Lafayette […]

  9. Stringer Bill Says:

    I am writing a whole book of fiction based on this battle. Any additional information would be loved this was great.

  10. Carlton Oneal Says:

    I am black.I am for union.I still believe that shooting that 1 armed confederate civilian with family in house was murder.

  11. Melanie Bartmess Says:

    I had a g-g-grandfather in the 39th Indiana. Wish I could learn more about what he may have or have not experienced in this battle. Accounts of their position at Murfreesboro are clearer – they were on picket at the very front of the right flank where the CSA cavalry first attacked. My g-g, Jacob Washington Bartmess, wrote in letters about that battle and subsequent imprisonment, but nothing remains of letters he may have written later at the time of Chickamauka

    From what I read, at Chickamauga their claim to fame besides carrying water to suffering troops was in a charge that was a distraction while Wilder came in from another side????

    • Michael Winner Says:

      The 39th Indiana was also a mounted infantry unit, and they also carried the Spencer Rifle. Though they were not part of Wilder’s Brigade, somehow they wound up fighting right along side of the Brigade. If you go to the Wilder monument at Chickamauga, you will find the 39th monument along side Wilder’s regiments. Shortly after Chickamauga they were designated as the 8th Indiana Cavalry.

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