It’s no secret that Braxton Bragg was a hard man to work for. He might be the most hated man in the Civil War. The Army of Tennessee had a difficult time under his tenure, arguably winning battles only to see those successes wasted by discord and dissension among the generals.
Let’s be fair, however, the men Bragg had to work with were often of not much help. It’s no secret that the army had leadership problems, and needed a house-cleaning. In fact, it wasn’t that much of a secret to President Davis or the Confederate Government in Richmond, either, though they didn’t seem to have a clear idea of what to do about it.
In fact, in the summer of 1863, it appears that some of that house-cleaning was happening. Hardee was gone, Bragg got a new chief of staff (William Whann Mackall) and two new men were coming to the army. But were they really a help?
I find it strange that Davis decided to send Generals D. H. Hill and T. C. Hindman to join Bragg. Why? Because both men had difficult reputations, and had already been shunted aside from other departments.
D. H. Hill had already been weighed and found wanting by Robert E. Lee. Hill could fight, and proved himself a capable division commander, it was true; but in Lee’s terms, “he croaked.” I can’t think of a worse combination of personalities: the dour, dyspeptic and acerbic Bragg; paired with the constant pessimism and sarcasm of Hill. It was once said of the Union General Gordon Granger that he never disliked a man without letting that man know it – a description that might as well be written for D.H. Harvey Hill would manage to find fault with nearly every decision Bragg made during the short course of their service together, from mid-July to mid-October, 1863. When Davis changed Hill’s orders from Mississippi to take command of Hardee’s old corps at Chattanooga, he slipped Bragg a poison pill every Federal had reason to rejoice over, had they but realized the logical outcome of that promotion.
Hindman wasn’t much better. Hindman was flamboyant, arrogant, and contentious. One boyhood aquaintance would go on to note that Hindman had “a wonderful ability to get in fusses.” Before the war, this was a man for whom politics was physical, and periodically life-threatening. He once had to hide behind the speaker’s podium in the Arkansas state house to keep an angry mob at bay; Pat Cleburne nearly died at his side during a gun-battle (Debates? Who needs debates?) in the streets of Helena Arkansas.
He was competent, and managed to accomplish quite a lot towards creating a field force out of scratch in his adopted state in 1862, but he also so managed to upset the locals that the entire Arkansas political delegation in Richmond pleaded with Davis to send Hindman packing by the end of that year.
All war is political, of course, all the more for Civil Wars. The hoary adage that amatuers study strategy, professionals study logistics needs an addendum: Generals need to be team-builders. Consummate political skills are an essential job requirement for great captains. We like our Pattons, all flamboyance and ivory (NOT pearl) handled pistols, but wars get won by the quiet competence of an Eisenhower.
Bragg was already saddled with Polk, the Bishop-Albatross around his neck. Sending both Hill and Hindman to him was an obvious recipe for disaster. Bragg, of course, must carry a heavy burden of guilt here, too – he was his own kind of prickly leadership-deficient commander, who needed no help in antagonizing generals.
Most readers will probably know that I have little sympathy for the Confederate Cause, but that doesn’t mean that my blood can’t still boil – if just a tad – when I think of how badly the rank and file of the Army of Tennessee were let down by their commanders.
February 20, 2012 at 5:14 pm |
Good point about Bragg and what he was burdened with (and certainly not in rationalization of his own deficiencies). Of course, they’d tried a “dry run” for this model at Stones River, when Bragg was gifted with Gideon Pillow for a brigade command. The model worked as one would have predicted, complete with Pillow “leading” from behind an ample-girthed tree during Breckinridge’s ill-fated January 2 attack on the Union left. Hill and Hindman look positively Lee-like in comparison. .
February 21, 2012 at 11:17 am |
Fascinating post. They had some of the most dysfunctional command structure of any American army.
I like how much Arthur Manigault in his book despised Hindman.and rips him throughout. There is some good info on Hindman contained in the endnotes of that book also.
Chris
February 24, 2012 at 8:02 pm |
I have read that Gen Loring said that he would rather lose a battle than serve under Pemberton and based on his performance at Champion Hill, he apparently meant it.
I wonder if the Confederate Generals at the time understood that they had the opportunity to not just reverse the Confederate setbacks of July but possibly win the war. Maybe they understood that but their own sense of pride or honor or personal insanity did not allow them to subordinate their opinions to achieve victory.
May 7, 2012 at 5:56 pm |
Hi Dave. Can you give us an update on the status of this blog? -Thanks.
May 11, 2012 at 2:22 pm |
Yes, I was wondering the same thing, too. J.D. Petruzzi has even been longer posting on his blog.
Chris
May 14, 2012 at 3:09 pm |
It is my first coment on your blog, so I have to say briefly that I admire your work immensely and appreciate you and your partner, Mr. Friedrich’s (in “Maps of Chickamauga” obviously) amazing contributions to history.
With that said though I think that you are pretty hard on D.H. Hill in Maps and this is what I want to address. I know that it is slightly off topic and has nothing to do with Davis’ decision to send Hindman and Hill to the army, but being that you are talking about D.H. Hill.
The only real blame that I believe can be assigned to Hill was his inability to locate Bragg and Polk and to lay down and rest at Thedfords ford until 3:00 A.M. when he resumed his search for Polk. He probably should have sent a staff officer to Alexanders ford to inform Polk that he wasn’t going to be at his Headquarters for at least a few more hours after Archer Anderson relayed Polk’s desire to meet with him. This also would have obligated J.A. Perkins and Charvet to stay out at the bridge and at the crossroads until Hill arrived, instead of just heading for Polk’s headquarters later in the night. Even though this was an error in judgement, influenced by incredible fatigue, I essentially relieve Hill of further responsibility in the fiasco.
For the debacle on the right wing, Polk holds tremendous responsibility. It is obvious that despite Polk’s later assertion that he told Anderson about the daylight attack order, it is obvious that he didn’t. As Hill’s biographer, Hal Bridges, points out Breckenridge wrote to Hill on Oct. 16, 1863 saying “I do not recollect that Lt. Gen Polk directed Col. Anderson to order you to attack at daylight.” Both J.A. Reid and A.C. Avery denied any mention of a daylight attack and obviously Anderson denies it. You don’t refute this in your book and it seems obvious that Anderson recited Polk’s words directly to Hill. Furthermore, Polk personally countermanded Reid’s instructions to guide Breckenridge towards the front and allowed Breckenridge to rest his men. He pushed no urgency on Reid for a meeting with Hill when he saw him there and Breckenridge remained completely adamant that no mention was ever made to him about a daylight attack order even though he stayed with Polk after camping the men for a significant portion of the night. Also when you consider Polk’s actions it is counter-intuitive to think that any order had been given for a major attack at time. Polk was showing no urgency whatsover, epitomized by his allowing Breckenridge to stop his men for a few hours without telling him of any pressing need to get in position e.t.c. This would lead someone to believe that Polk was making a conscience decision to disobey Bragg’s orders (which he was obviously disgusted with), but he relayed them to Cheatham via courier and to W.H.T. Walker when he came to his headquarters. Also, if he was trying to ignore the orders why tell Hill that he needs to meet with him that night? And he certainly wouldn’t have sent John Fisher to find HIll! But if it is the case that he was trying to carry out the attack, then how could he behave the way he did with Breckenridge? I have thought that possibly he wanted to communicate official attack orders only with his direct subordinates (Cheatham commanding the independent division, Walker and Hill) but then how could he bypass Hill on the morning of the 20th, after Pollock Lee urged Polk’s cooperation and send direct attack orders to Cleburne and Breckenridge?
Polk’s behavior on the night of the 19th-20th is almost impossible to figure out and chief blame resides with him. Once Hill was aware of the orders, he reacted as quickly as he possibly could on the morning of the 20th considering that the men were already eating and the problems with Cleburne’s frontage overlapping Stewart’s e.t.c. Polk however was unaware of these problems in disposition, made little effort to coordinate Cheatham’s units with Hill’s assault, made no attempt to coordinate Walker’s corps with Hill’s attack and ultimately left it to two subordinate officers (Hill and Walker) to bicker over how those troops should be allocated.
In conclusion, I think your work is amazing, but I think you are somewhat unfair with Hill. I agree with Connelly’s interpretation in Autumn of Glory “Hill is partly at fault for not making a more determined effort to locate either Bragg or Polk during the night…,” but goes on to say “Bragg and Polk seem chiefly to blame for the fiasco that night.” (Page 220)
I think Hill should be exonerated of all guilt aside from his inability to find Bragg and Polk and if you have any further insights into Polk that night that may refute my interpretation, I am open to hearing them.
Thanks
-Nathan Towne
May 15, 2012 at 2:33 pm |
I am sorry for getting kind of off topic there yesterday.
As for the content of the post, may I add one point? That is that Davis is in a terrible position with the Army of Tennessee by July of 1863. For the third time in the war Bragg’s army is at Chatanooga, but unlike in the summer and autumn of 1862, Bragg doesn’t have many good options. His ranks are massively depleted from malnutrition and disease, morale is at an all time low, there is now an organized Anti-Bragg movement in the army with clout in Richmond and he loses his best officer in William Hardee which forces to begin to restructure the entire high command.
The situation for Davis is desperate. If Davis replaces Bragg now, who will he replace him with? Johnston did everything he could in the spring to avoid being appointed to the post and Davis is now entagled in the most damaging fued of the war with Johnston over command theory in the west and responsibility for the setbacks. Davis isn’t going to reinstate Beauregard. Lee doesn’t want to come West and Sidney Johnston is dead. That leaves only subordinate officers, notably Hardee, Longstreet and Polk and he has no assurances that Hardee (who is in my opinion the best option of those three officers) will take the position. So he decides to give Bragg as many men and experienced officers from other departments as he can. He sends Breckenridge’s division back to Bragg from Johnston along with W.H.T. Walker’s division and more cavalry. He disolves the East Tennessee department and gives William Preston’s division along with his senior officer Simon Buckner to Bragg. He agrees to detach two divisions from argubably the best Corps in the Confederacy along with their commander from the army of Northern Virginia. Lastly, he sends the two most experienced officers who are not occupying a vital post, in Hill and Hindman, to the army to fill positions in this buildup.
It is easy for us to be critical now, but Davis had to act and he had to act quickly. So he sent five divisions from across the Confederacy, including two divisions already comprising a cohesive Corps under Longstreet and three of the most experienced officers that he could free up for Bragg to allocate at his discretion. I don’t see much else that Davis could have done.